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Introduction 
 
* ‘Leurs goûts ont décidé son sort.’ 
 
The above sentence is an attempt at translation by an Anglophone, for the English 
Their taste decided his fate. It is flawed because the translator has omitted the word de after 
the verb ont décidé. De is a preposition that must be inserted automatically between the 
verb décider and a following object in French. The translator was ignorant of this fact and 
made a mistake. How could (s)he have known that a preposition was needed in French, 
when none is used in the English equivalent of this sentence ? The current way of dealing 
with this issue is for a non-native speaker of French, to memorise the correct verbal 
construction, including the preposition de, in the lexical entry for the verb décider.  
The issue at stake in this example is transitivity. In the English sentence Their taste decided 
his fate, it is said that the verb to decide is directly transitive since it does not involve any 
preposition; however, the French equivalent Leurs goûts ont décidé de son sort introduces the 
preposition de between the verb and its object: it is said that décider is an indirect transitive 
verb. Transitivity is a phenomenon widely attested across languages. It is generally 
accepted that it has universal properties. Regardless of the languages concerned, certain 
types of verbs seem destined to behave transitively and others intransitively.  
Intransitive verbs have no objects at all. Givón (1990) gives a classification of verbs, of 
which certain categories, according to him, are universally intransitive. They include 
subjectless verbs „[which] most commonly denote natural or atmospheric phenomena‟ 
(Givón, p.89): examples are It is raining/Il pleut, in which both it and il are impersonal 
subject pronouns. Copular sentences of the type He is a teacher or She is tall, where the 
predicate is a noun or an adjective, not a verb, are often used in a habitual sense for 
descriptions. Objectless verbs describe states, as opposed to events or processes: Givón 
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gives the examples My child is sick or The woman is sad for the Bemba language. And finally, 
he cites verbs requiring a sentential subject, of the type be true, be likely, be good, be difficult, 
etc. because they also use an adjective as their predicate; Givón states that they are either 
epistemic or evaluative in nature, or that they assess „ease-of-performance‟. Each of these 
categories then appears to be semantically motivated, and semantic motifs can be traced 
across languages. The assumption is that the same semantic values in all languages (give 
or take a few exceptions) will translate into syntactic structures of varying forms maybe, 
but of identical transitivity. Any of the above categories mentioned by Givón should 
yield a syntactic structure of intransitive form. On the other hand, a sentence involving at 
least two interacting participants fulfils the basic requirements for transitivity, and such a 
combination should yield syntactic structures of a transitive nature in any language.  
However, let us come back to our starting point. The sentence Their taste decided his 
fate/Leurs goûts ont décidé de son sort always presented us with two participants, in French or 
in English. In any language, a process is taking place between their taste and his fate (or 
between leurs goûts and son sort), whereby the object is affected by the subject. The 
difference between the two languages does not therefore reside in the issue of transitivity 
per se, but in the determination of its directness or indirectness. Why does French 
require an object to be made indirect by introduction of a preposition after the verb 
décider, while English favours a direct relation between the equivalent verb to decide and its 
following object ? 
 
In our first chapter, we will provide definitions for the common types of transitivity 
patterns to be found in both English and French. In the second and third chapters, we 
will give an overview of current research into the issue of transitivity. In chapters 4 and 5, 
we will attempt to find an explanation for the difference in transitivity displayed by a 
number of verbs in English and in French. Our primary purpose here is to investigate 
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the concept of transitivity with a view to establishing what distinguishes its directness 
from its indirectness. In so doing, we should be able to find out whether those are issues 
of universal scope, or whether they are language-specific. We will draw conclusions in 
our chapter 6. 
 
Throughout this work, we have used numerous examples to illustrate theoretical points, 
as well as specific sentences for the data analysis. Each example bears the number of the 
chapter it appears in, and its own reference: for instance, the first example used in 
chapter 1 is referred to as (1.1). The data on the other hand, is clearly marked by the 
uppercase D and a number referring to the verb dealt with, as well as a lowercase letter 
for each sentence used as example. The entire database is presented in an appendix. For 
example, the first verb in the database is referred to as (D1); examples of this verb as 
used in discourse could be (D1a), (D1b), etc. The data will be both in English and in 
French. An extension of the data can be found in chapter 4, where we specifically 
investigate the pronominal forms of those verbs; in this instance, the examples we use 
are clearly marked by the uppercase P. 
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Chapter 1: Argument structure and transitivity: definitions 
 
What are argument structure and transitivity ? We must begin with clear definitions of 
those concepts, and of a number of related ideas. 
 
1.1. Argument structure 
 
1.1.1. Predication 
 
Every sentence has something to say. What is meant can be referred to as the 
predication. The predicating elements of a sentence form its nucleus, its basic meaningful 
unit. They include two types of words: the arguments of the predication, and the non-
arguments. According to Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), „core arguments are those 
arguments which are part of the semantic representation of the verb‟ (p.26). Although  
it is used by many linguists as a syntactic function, the concept of argument is primarily a 
semantic concept, and we will use it as such in this study. An argument is a phrase that 
holds a close meaningful relation to the predicate of a sentence. In essence, the predicate 
on its own would be meaningless in the context of an utterance. One or several 
arguments necessarily appear in the sentence alongside their predicate in order to form a 
meaningful unit. 
In a sentence like  
 
(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers 
 
the predicate removed  which refers to the process taking place in this utterance, and is  
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expressed through the medium of a verb, does not make sense when used in isolation: 
 
(1.2) *removed 
 
More information is needed for any recipient to decode this message, among which at 
least one agent must be specified for the process. In English, this is usually done by using 
a noun as subject for the verb-predicate. 
 
(1.3) *Suzy removed 
 
But the meaning of (1.3) is not yet clear. In order to complete the argumentation of 
remove, we must specify the object affected by the process. It is the splinters that have been 
removed by Suzy. Hence the phrase 
 
(1.4) Suzy removed the splinters 
 
now forms a complete unit in which the predicate removed becomes meaningful. 
 
1.1.2.  Argument versus non-argument 
 
It is said that the verb to remove is a 2-argument verb, since it can only effect its meaning 
with the help of two elements: one placed before the verb is known as the first argument 
(it is represented here by Suzy and usually refers to the entity that starts the process 
expressed by the verb); in this case, a second argument (the splinters) is necessary and 
appears immediately after the verb; that element usually designates an entity that the 
process aims to affect specifically. It is also said that the verb remove has a valency of 2. 
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On the other hand, sentences also contain elements which are not indispensable to the 
comprehension of the predicate. Those are the non-arguments. In many syntactic 
theories, they also go by the name of „adjunct‟.  
In the sentence  
 
(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers 
 
we have just explained how the elements Suzy and the splinters solely are deemed 
indispensable to the comprehension of the process expressed by the predicate removed. 
Other types of information such as the time (yesterday) and instrument used (with tweezers) 
are not directly linked to the meaning of the verb to remove, and could therefore disappear 
without affecting the correctness of the sentence: 
 
(1.4) Suzy removed the splinters 
 
The sequence of a first argument followed by a verb, followed by a second argument is 
the most frequent construction to be found in languages like English and French. 
In grammatical terminology, it corresponds to the traditional SVO order of words, where 
S stands for the subject (our first argument), V for the verb and O for the object (or 
second argument). But not every predicate necessitates the support of two arguments in 
order to fulfil its meaning. One- or three-argument structures (or verbs with a valency of 
1 or 3) are also common. When a construction allows more than one argument after its 
verb, the third and subsequent arguments may also be called objects. In this study, we 
will use the terms „subject‟ to refer to the first argument of predication _ to be found 
before the verb_ and we will restrict the term „object‟ to the second argument, that which 
immediately follows the verb.  
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1.1.3. Direct versus oblique arguments 
 
Many linguists, including Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), argue that the distinctions we 
have just made are universal. That is to say that the semantic concepts of predication, 
argument and non-argument, underpin the meaning of sentences in any language. 
However, the manner in which those relations are formalised at a syntactic level can vary 
greatly across languages. 
In English, as in French, nouns and verbs usually serve as arguments. Moreover, and 
crucially for us in the study with which we shall be concerned here, in many languages 
some arguments are marked by prepositions, whereas others are not. This is due to a 
case-marking system, which could still be active as in  Icelandic, or inherited from an old 
form of the language as in English or in French. Unmarked arguments are called direct 
arguments, whilst marked arguments are called oblique. In traditional grammar, second 
arguments which are unmarked are called direct objects, and second arguments which are 
marked, i.e. are introduced by a preposition in languages such as English and French, are 
called indirect objects. 
However let it be noted that any word introduced by a preposition is not necessarily an 
oblique argument, and that every unmarked word is not necessarily a direct argument of 
the predicate. Non-arguments can also use prepositions (or not). The debate over the 
best way to distinguish arguments from non-arguments is not within our remit here. In 
this study, we will always try to give clear examples of predication, with unambiguous 
arguments, be they either direct or oblique. For that reason, we will employ the 
grammatical terminology of direct and indirect object, to avoid burdensome labels such 
as „direct second argument‟ and „oblique second (or third, etc.) argument‟. 
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1.1.4. Prominence of the arguments 
 
In Grimshaw‟s definition „[…] argument structure represents a complex of information 
critical to the syntactic behaviour of a lexical item. […] the term refers to the lexical 
representation of grammatical information about a predicate. The a-structure of a lexical 
item is this part of its lexical entry.‟ (Grimshaw, 1990, p.1). We had already established 
that the concept of argument structure was linked to semantics since a predicate needs its 
arguments in order to make sense in context; we also suspected that argument structure 
participated in the determination of syntactic behaviours for its predicate, since similar 
argument relations can yield various syntactic structures for a given predicate in different 
languages. We can now assume that argument structure also holds a close relationship to 
the lexicon. „Complex‟ of information is probably an adequate description for such a 
versatile notion. 
Grimshaw later fine-tunes her definition: „A-structure is a structured representation 
which represents prominence relations among arguments‟ (p.4). She goes on to state that 
such prominence relations are determined by  thematic and aspectual considerations, but 
we need not speculate on the subject in our present study. What Grimshaw establishes 
here is a very relevant notion sometimes referred to as „saliency‟ or „foregrounding‟, 
which we shall see more of in the course of this work. The idea that certain arguments in 
the set that forms the a-structure of a predicate, are more „important‟ than others will be 
central to our thinking. For instance, Grimshaw distinguishes the „external‟ argument 
from the „internal‟ argument (or arguments) of a predicate. From a syntactic point of 
view, an external argument is an argument which is not governed under the predicate. In 
the example 
 
(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers 
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the argument Suzy would appear under the highest node of a tree diagram, above its 
predicate removed, whereas the argument the splinters is a daughter of the same predicate. 
Thus „the external argument is the most prominent argument in the a-structure of a 
predicate […] an argument is external or internal by virtue of its intrinsic relations to 
other arguments. Its status cannot be changed except by the introduction of another 
argument.‟ (p.5) 
In languages such as English and French, when S-V-O sentences are used, the external 
argument is realised as the subject of the verb-predicate, and the internal arguments are 
its objects. The nature of the relation that links the predicate and its internal arguments 
(or, to use grammatical terminology, the verb and its objects), or indeed that links the 
objects among themselves, and their possible hierarchy, can now be investigated through 
the concept of transitivity. 
 
1.2. Transitivity 
 
Roughly, we can say that the term transitivity refers to the status of the internal 
arguments, and to the relationship they hold to their predicate. There exist several sorts 
of those relationships, so we will now present several syntactic structures for English and 
French predicates, and discuss various issues affecting them. 
 
1.2.1.  Intransitivity 
 
The most basic form of transitivity is actually the absence of any transitivity for a 
predicate. Some verbs convey all of their meaning without the help of any internal 
argument. Such constructions are said by many linguists, including Givón (1990), to be 
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common across the languages of the world, to depict mainly states (as opposed to events 
or processes) and weather phenomena.  
It is certainly the case in both French and English. Copular sentences of the type (1.5) to 
(1.8) below all refer to states and they are all intransitive: 
 
(1.5)  Sammy was a carpenter 
 
(1.6)  Sammy  était  charpentier 
      Sammy  was  carpenter 
 „Sammy was a carpenter‟ 
 
(1.7)  Their dog seems sick 
 
(1.8)  Leur  fille   est  devenue  triste  après  la  mort  
      Their  daughter PAST  became sad  after  the  death  
 „Their daughter became sad after the death  
 
      de  son  père 
      of  her  father 
 of her father‟ 
 
In the same manner, utterances relating to the weather are also intransitive in both 
languages, as in (1.9) to (1.12):  
 
(1.9)  The sun is shining 
 
(1.10)  Le  soleil  brille 
       The  sun  shines 
 „The sun is shining‟ 
 
 
(1.11)  Raindrops keep falling on my head 
 
 
(1.12)  La  neige  tombe  sur  les  sommets 
         The snow    falls      on  the  mountain tops 
„Snow is falling on the  mountain tops‟ 
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1.2.2.        Middle verbs 
 
This type of transitivity relation refers to processes and events, and it is thus different 
from intransitive constructions. However in English, like the intransitive constructions, it 
is typically deprived of any internal arguments. 
 
(1.13) Bread cuts easily 
 
(1.14)  The knife sharpens 
 
But a translation into French of the examples above will yield very different syntactic 
patterns; this shows again that similar argument structures do not necessarily mean 
similar syntax, especially in a cross-linguistic context.    
 
 
(1.15)  Le  pain  se coupe  facilement 
        The bread cuts  easily 
„Bread cuts easily‟ 
 
 
(1.16)  On  coupe  le  pain    facilement 
         One   cuts      the  bread  easily 
„Bread cuts easily‟ 
 
 
(1.17)  Le  couteau  s‟aiguise 
        The  knife      sharpens 
„The knife sharpens‟ 
 
 
Here we can actually avail of two translations for Bread cuts easily, with very dissimilar 
syntactic strategies. Example (1.15) uses a form of the verb known as pronominal, which 
is common in Romance languages, but has no equivalent in English; example (1.16) uses 
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a more traditional S-V-O pattern with an impersonal subject. A passive construction 
could have been acceptable as well, depending on the context of the utterance. Example 
(1.17) again uses the pronominal form of the verb. Whereas the on form possesses an 
internal argument le pain, the se pronominal form is more ambiguous, and there exists a 
point of contention among linguists on the subject of whether se must be construed as an 
argument or not. We will return to such pronominal forms in the course of our study.   
 
1.2.3. Direct transitivity 
 
The most frequent type of transitivity pattern to be found in both French and English is 
the direct transitive one. By this we mean that the predicate‟s internal argument holds a 
direct relation to that verb without the help of any preposition. Direct transitivity seems 
to be associated with verbs of motion, of contact and of transformation particularly well 
in both languages as the examples below demonstrate: 
 
(1.18) Susan drove the car to the airport  
(1.19)  Susan   a  conduit   la  voiture     à  l‟ aéroport 
        Susan   PAST  drove      the  car            to  the  airport 
„Susan drove the car to the airport‟ 
 
(1.20)  An old lady stroked the cat 
(1.21)  Une  vieille  femme  caressa  le  chat 
An   old       lady      stroked   the  cat 
„An old lady stroked the cat‟ 
 
(1.22)  Les converted his garage into a gym 
 
(1.23)  Les   a          transformé   son  garage    en    salle de musculation 
       Les   PAST  converted           his    garage    in   gym 
„Les converted his garage into a gym‟ 
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In all those examples, the first internal argument _ the one closest to the verb_ is a direct 
object of the verb. Note that in the above, the phrases to the airport/à l’aéroport and into a 
gym/en salle de musculation may also be internal arguments of the predicate, indirect ones 
we might add, as they would be linked to the verb via the prepositions to/à and into/en. 
However, as it is the status of the first internal argument that typically determines the 
type of transitivity to be attributed to the predicate, the verbs drove and converted will still 
be called „direct transitive‟.  
 
1.2.4. Indirect transitivity 
 
Unsurprisingly, we will call those predicates whose second argument comes along with a 
preposition, „indirect transitive‟. Here are a few examples in both English and French.  
 
(1.24)  I spoke to the chairman of the board yesterday 
(1.25)   The archer aims at the target 
(1.26)  Tout le monde  a   participé   à  la  soirée 
         Everyone  PAST  contributed    to  the  party 
„Everyone contributed to the party‟ 
(1.27)  Salomé    sort    avec  Jean-Marc   depuis  trois  mois 
        Salomé     goes out with jean-Marc    for three    months 
„Salomé has been going out with Jean-Marc for three months‟ 
 
 
In each of the above cases a preposition links the argument immediately following the 
verb, to its predicate. What distinguishes a direct from an indirect relation between a 
predicate and its first internal argument, is not at all obvious. We may assume that the 
presence of a preposition before an indirect object, is somehow motivated; but what kind 
of motivation is at stake here ? We must ask that question in the next few chapters, as it 
cuts to the core of what transitivity really is. Whereas syntactic observations such as the 
 14 
presence or absence of prepositions before internal arguments may help us label 
predicates, they will not assist in any way our understanding of the true nature of the 
transitivity phenomenon, which, like argument structure, must be semantically motivated. 
 
1.2.5. Ditransitivity 
 
There remains one major pattern of transitivity for us to investigate. Ditransitivity is a 
type of argument structure in which the predicate has two direct internal arguments. It is 
particularly common in English for verbs of communication, which construe both the 
message and its recipient as direct internal arguments, while the sender is embodied by 
the external argument. So we are dealing here with a 3-argument structure. Here are 
some examples: 
 
(1.28) Rick immediately faxed Dinah the message  
 
(1.29) I asked you a question 
 
(1.30)  Mrs Warren told Mrs Smith the news 
 
Of the two internal arguments, the recipient is closest to the verb and takes on the status 
of first internal argument; then the message is given the status of second internal 
argument. 
 However, there is another way to construe the same relations between those predicates 
and their arguments. One could also say: 
 
(1.31)  Rick immediately faxed the message to Dinah  
 
(1.32)  Mrs Warren told the news to Mrs Smith 
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Here the message is construed as the internal argument closest to the predicate, and the 
recipient is now the second internal argument only. Note that in so doing, it has become 
an indirect argument through the addition of a preposition to. But this alternative 
argument structure is not acceptable when applied to example (1.29): 
 
(1.33)  * I asked a question to you 
 
Therefore, we cannot assume that both constructions are absolutely synonymous. There 
must be a reason why one is sometimes favoured over the other, and especially why both 
constructions are not acceptable to all verbs of communication. The answer lies in the 
relation between the predicate and the argument that refers to the recipient of the 
communication process. In essence, we are faced here with the problem of ordering the 
internal arguments; we have already seen that such ordering is based on what Grimshaw 
called „prominence‟ relations. In the examples (1.28) to (1.30), the identity of the 
recipient is construed as more prominent than the nature of the message itself. In (1.31) 
and (1.32), it is the message which seems more important, while the identity of the 
recipient recedes to the background of the process. In the sentence*I asked a question to 
you, it is the recipient who matters, since the predicate ask always implies an argument 
question by its own meaning; therefore the argument a question is actually a redundancy 
here; it is deemed less important than the argument you. Thus the form I asked you a 
question is favoured in English as you logically assumes the position of first internal 
argument, while a question can only be the second internal argument. 
The theory of prominence however does not explain why the recipient, when expressed 
as the second internal argument, should also become indirect. This sort of enigma relates 
precisely to the nature of the concept of transitivity. 
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Finally we shall add a word about the way in which French deals with such ditransitive 
sentences. Let us translate the examples (1.28) to (1.30): 
 
(1.34)  Rick   a           immédiatement  faxé   le  message    à  Dinah  
        Rick   PAST   immediately   faxed   the  message    to  Dinah 
         „Rick immediately faxed Dinah the message‟ 
 
(1.35)  Je t‟        ai  posé   une  question 
        I  you    PAST asked    a     question 
        „I asked you a question‟ 
 
 
(1.36)  Mrs Warren  a    annoncé  la  nouvelle  à  Mrs Smith 
        Mrs Warren    PAST announced    the  news       to  Mrs Smith 
        „Mrs Warren told Mrs Smith the news‟ 
 
 
We must immediately emphasise that there seems to be no provision for ditransitivity in 
the French language. The argument structure here favours a direct internal argument 
followed by an indirect one. The message is construed as the first internal argument (i.e. 
the direct one), and the recipient as the second internal argument, the indirect one. This 
is absolutely identical to the alternative construction we have just seen for verbs of 
communication in English.  
How come French does not allow two direct internal arguments as English does ? 
Strictly speaking, this is not absolutely accurate. Ruwet (1972) actually mentions some 
examples of ditransitivity in French, of the type: 
 
(1.37)  On    a  élu     Patrice    président 
        One    PAST elected   Patrice     president 
        „Patrice was elected president‟ 
 
 
But according to him, such examples are limited to processes dealing with positions of 
authority; and one cannot help but notice that both internal arguments here, Patrice and 
président, actually refer to the same person.  
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Interlingual differences in the syntax of argument structure, as well as intralingual ones, 
must take their roots in the semanticity of the process at stake. In other words, there 
must be a semantic explanation for the impossibility of ditransitive constructions for 
verbs of communication in French. It resides in the relation between the predicate and 
its recipient, which appears to be construed differently in both English and French. 
 
Having presented the key concepts pertaining to the domain of argument structure, as 
well as a definition of the term itself, and having explained the main types of transitivity 
available to verbs in both French and English, we can now formulate the key question 
that will motivate the present study. We know that for the same argument structure, 
different languages will not necessarily yield similar syntactic patterns. However, as we 
shall concentrate further on the status of the first internal argument, which crucially 
determines a predicate‟s transitivity, we must note again that transitivity is a remarkably 
stable phenomenon across the languages of the world. Effectively, most predicates are 
transitive in any language. Whether transitivity is direct or indirect, depending on the 
status of the first internal argument, is a more complex and confusing issue. How does a 
predicate select direct or indirect transitivity in the context of its argument structure ? 
This is the question that will now concern us, and we shall start by investigating some of 
the literature that deals with the nature of the concept of transitivity.     
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Chapter 2: How are argument structure and transitivity determined (I):  
      theories of the syntax-semantics interface 
 
Traditionally, it is assumed that there is a correlation between the semantic units that 
underlie an a-structure, and the syntactic patterns that a-structure yields for its predicate. 
How semantics links to syntax and/or vice-versa is the concern of three such 
approaches. 
 
2.1.  Hopper and Thompson: defining and identifying transitivity 
 
‘...Transitivity is not dichotomous, but is a continuum,[...]’ (p. 266) 
 
Hopper and Thompson‟s article, published in 1980, remains the authoritative reference 
on the topic of transitivity. This is the „definition‟ they adopt for the concept of 
transitivity: „Transitivity is traditionally understood as a global property of an entire 
clause, such that an activity is „carried-over‟ or „transferred‟ from an agent to a patient. 
Transitivity in the traditional view thus necessarily involves at least two participants [...], 
and an action which is typically EFFECTIVE in some way‟ (p.251).1 
Transitivity, they allege, can be pinpointed in discourse by a series of tell-tale signs. These 
ten criteria are either morphosyntactic or semantic in nature. Each criterion in its own 
way refers to „the effectiveness or intensity with which the action is transferred from one 
participant to another‟ (p.252). Therefore, this transfer or carry-over between participants 
is construed as more or less effective, or more or less intense. That is why transitivity is not, in 
                                                 
1
 Hopper and Thompson do not use the words „patient‟ and „agent‟ as participant roles, 
but rather as prototypical arguments. „Agent‟ stands for „1st argument‟ of the process, 
and „patient‟ for „2nd argument‟. 
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Hopper and Thompson‟s view, an either-or choice, but a continuum. Sentences are more 
or less transitive, or to use their terminology „highly-transitive‟ or low-transitive.  
 
We can study in detail the criteria selected by Hopper and Thompson to determine the 
level of transitivity of a given sentence. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
As transitivity refers to a transferring process, two participants are required. One-
participant sentences are deemed intransitive. However, the authors point out that many 
two-participant sentences are actually intransitive across languages because it is also 
preferable that, in a process of transfer, the O (or object) be animate. Many two-
participant processes in which the second argument is inanimate, do not actually qualify 
as carry-over, and cannot therefore be transitive according to Hopper and Thompson.  
B. KINESIS 
For any carry-over to take place, there must be some type of movement of the Object. 
Whether that movement is physical or more symbolic is open to interpretation.  
C. ASPECT 
The two values selected by the authors are telic, corresponding to a transitive process, 
and atelic, for an intransitive one. Telicity concerns the holistic interpretation of a 
process: wherever it can be attributed an endpoint, the process described by the verb is 
said to be telic. 1 
In an incomplete process the O could be viewed as less (or not entirely) affected, while 
with a perfective verb, the O would be totally transferred. Affectedness of O is another 
of Hopper and Thompson‟s criteria, to which we will return shortly. 
                                                 
1 Those values parallel the perfective/imperfective dichotomy. In Hopper and 
Thompson‟s analysis, a perfective verb is more likely to be transitive, and an imperfect 
verb is more likely to be intransitive.  
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D. PUNCTUALITY 
A highly-transitive verb would show a tendency to carry a punctual value, whereas a low-
transitive verb would tend to be non-punctual. Non-punctuality can refer to an 
imperfective, or even iterative, value, so that this analysis seems to confirm our previous 
point. 
E. VOLITIONALITY 
As we hinted at earlier on, a highly-transitive process should involve volitional  
participants. The more volitional the participants, the more transitivity there will be in the 
sentence.  
F. AFFIRMATION 
This category actually concerns the status of negation in relation to transitivity. For any 
carry-over to take place, it seems logical that an affirmative value also be applied to the 
process. A process which would be denied would signal low-transitivity. 
G. MODE 
Hopper and Thompson oppose the realis value of indicative modes to the irrealis value 
of all other modes such as the subjunctive, the conditional, the optative, etc. They 
systematically link realis to high-transitivity and irrealis to low-transitivity. This 
connection can be justified in the same way as the AFFIRMATIVE criterion: a process 
which is put in doubt, is less likely to actually take place and is therefore a candidate for 
low transitivity. 
H. AGENCY 
In order for any carry-over to take place, an agent should initiate the process. Preferably, 
this should be an animate agent. So where evidence of agency can be found, we should 
have a highly-transitive verb; where non-agency seems to be the case, low-transitivity is 
more obvious. 
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I. AFFECTEDNESS OF O 
If a transfer occurs in the process described by the verb, the object of the sentence 
should be greatly affected: an affected O is more likely to be part of a transitive clause, 
but an unaffected O would be associated with an intransitive clause. Hopper and 
Thompson see morphosyntactic evidence in ergative languages where case-marking 
distinguishes transitive from intransitive sentences: a transitive sentence shows ergative 
case-marking on A (the agent) and absolutive case-marking on O; intransitive sentences 
have only one participant, i.e. A, and it is in the nominative case.   
J. INDIVIDUATION OF O 
Affectedness of O eventually leads to the question of the individuation of O, or to what 
extent is O an independent word. Hopper and Thompson show that when O is highly 
affected by a process, it will preferably be given a definite interpretation (it could be 
preceded by a definite article in French or in English). But when O is less affected, it 
tends to take on an indefinite value. The authors find proof that in certain languages a 
less affected O is effectively incorporated into the verb, thereby losing its status as an 
independent word. So a highly individuated O will be a mark of high transitivity and a 
less individuated O will signal low transitivity. 
 
Having presented convincing data from a variety of languages in support of their criteria, 
Hopper and Thompson can now formulate a TRANSITIVITY HYPOTHESIS: 
 “If two clauses (a) and (b) in a language differ in that (a) is higher in Transitivity 
according to any of the features [A-J], then, if a concomitant grammatical or 
semantic difference appears elsewhere in the clause, that difference will also show 
(a) to be higher in Transitivity.‟ (p.255) 
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All or some of the criteria will combine to point out in the direction of transitivity or 
intransitivity along a continuous scale. Clusters will form in one direction or the other, 
indicating which option should be preferred. 
The weakness of Hopper and Thompson‟s article however is that it does not address the 
question of the syntax-semantics interface. Presumably, each language will determine a 
cut-off point between them, and this may vary across languages.  
 
Ideally, it would be helpful to regroup all the criteria under a larger concept. Hopper and 
Thompson have attempted just that by linking transitivity to foregrounding. 
Foregrounding is a discourse concept, not unlike Grimshaw‟s prominence relations: it 
describes all manners of bringing new information into discourse against a background 
of already acquired information. Ultimately the choice of transitive or intransitive clauses 
would lie with the Speaker. It is (s)he who would control whether a process should be 
encoded as a new piece of information, and would eventually assign it highly transitive 
values, or whether it would already be known and should be intransitive in form. 
Statistical proof is provided with the study of different texts. The authors remark that „in 
languages like English, foregrounding is not marked absolutely, but is instead indicated 
and interpreted on a probabilistic basis; and the likelihood that a clause will receive a 
foregrounded interpretation is proportional to the height of that clause on the scale of 
Transitivity‟ (p.286). 
 
2.2. Langacker: a cognitive account of transitivity 
 
Some cognitive linguists have approached the issue of transitivity, notably Talmy (1988) 
with his concept of force dynamics. Langacker (1991) offers the most elaborate model in 
this field. Using the metaphor of a stage to represent sentences as plays, he distinguishes 
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the setting from the participants: whereas in discourse the setting of a „play‟ is provided 
by adverbials of time and space for instance, the actors (or participants) in the play are 
the objects and the subjects that engage in interactions. A sentence thus illustrates a 
process of „energy transmission‟ between the participants. Sentence structure is the 
reflection of that process. A sentence is essentially the expression of an „action chain‟ in 
which a „head‟ emits energy towards another participant; the second participant in turn 
can transmit this energy to a third entity, and so on. This „action chain‟ can continue until 
a participant interrupts the transmission of the energy flow by absorbing it. The last 
participant in the chain is called the „tail‟. For instance, in the sentence 
 
(2.1) At lunchtime Frederick ate soup with a fork 
 
Frederick is the source (or „head‟ of the action chain) which transmits energy to a fork 
which in turn plunges into the soup. The process ends there with the soup as the tail of 
the chain. This whole process involves physical contact between Frederick and the fork, 
and between the fork and the soup. But action chains also apply to mental processes 
according to Langacker. 
 
(2.2) The children are watching television 
 
In this example, the children initiate an action chain which is clearly directed at the 
television. Even though no physical contact happens between the two participants, the 
flow of energy is no less real in cognitive terms. Instead of „head‟ and „tail‟, Langacker 
speaks of „experiencer‟ and „experienced‟. 
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With his model, Langacker believes that he can explain different types of argument 
structures. According to him, the number of arguments expressed in a sentence reflects 
the number of participants of the action chain that the speaker wishes to mention.  The 
choice of which argument becomes the subject also relies on the number of participants 
and the direction of the energy flow. For instance, a middle construction such as 
 
(2.3) The channel changed 
 
is the result of an action chain in which the speaker focuses solely on the last participant 
affected by the process: here, the channel is the tail of the action chain. 
But a typically transitive sentence like 
 
(2.4) Paula changed the channel 
 
mentions both the head of the energy flow (Paula) and its tail (the channel). The head 
assumes the subject position, and the tail is the object. 
Eventually, Langacker also accounts for instrumental constructions of the type 
 
(2.5) Paula changed the channel with the remote control 
 
Here the action chain is as follows: 
 
(2.6) Paula    the remote control    the channel 
 
We must note that, although the channel is the tail of the chain, it does not occupy the 
last argument-slot in the corresponding sentence. That is because Langacker‟s conception 
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of energy transmission does not in any way assess prominence. His is a linear, time-based 
model. But let us remember that the ordering of arguments in syntactic frames is the 
result of prominence relations among the participants. 
Finally, Langacker also provides his own explanation for ditransitive sentences. In his 
opinion, sentences such as 
 
(2.7) Bríd gave Paul the keys 
 
are not the result of a simple causal chain that would result in Paul getting the keys. 
It is rather a combination of the physical process of Bríd handing the keys to Paul, and of 
the mental process of Paul acknowledging his receiving them. Not everyone agrees with 
this conception however. 
 
We now know enough of Langacker‟s model to support Hopper and Thompson‟s 
definition of transitivity as a „transfer‟, with a cognitive basis. Transitivity is a transfer of 
energy, either physical or mental, between participants. However this cognitive view 
cannot explain the ordering of arguments within a syntactic frame, so we will now return 
to our investigation of the syntax-semantics interface.   
 
2.3.  Van Valin and LaPolla: searching for linking rules  
 
In Syntax: structure, meaning and function (1997), Van Valin and LaPolla elaborate a theory of 
how to link semantics to syntax and vice-versa. We will limit ourselves to their account 
of the linkage of argument structure.  
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In their view, every sentence involving a verb describes a state of affair in the world, 
which is a combination of two elements: the predication, as expressed by the verb itself, 
and the reference, i.e. the participants of the predication process (subjects, objects or 
oblique participants). From a semantic perspective, participant roles are varied and 
numerous. Van Valin and LaPolla use an exhaustive list of participant roles in their 
theory, such as AGENT, EFFECTOR, EXPERIENCER, INSTRUMENT, FORCE, 
PATIENT, THEME, BENEFACTIVE, RECIPIENT, GOAL, SOURCE, LOCATION 
and PATH. Predication also covers a wide range of situations, and here VanValin and 
LaPolla refer to the theory of Aktionsart as presented by Vendler (1967). In parallel with 
the concepts of situation, event, process and action described in Aktionsart, they propose 
the terms state, activity, accomplishment and achievement, which actually correspond to 
Vendler‟s classification. It is not of direct interest to us to try and classify verbs in this 
manner, other than because this system forms the basis of what the authors term the 
Logical Structure (or LS) of a verb. 
 
Each verb in the lexicon is assigned a Logical Structure that paraphrases how the 
participants involved in the process described by this verb actually relate to/act upon  
one another. Therefore LS integrates both predication and reference in order to give  
as complete and accurate a description of the meaning of the verb as is possible.  
An example of Logical Structure for the verb to show in the sentence Mary showed the 
photograph to Sam goes like this: 
 
(2.8) [do‟(Mary,Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME see‟ (Sam, photograph)] 
 
Once established the Logical Structure will help us determine the valency, transitivity and 
macroroles used by the verb to form its syntactic output. Van Valin and LaPolla only use 
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the notion of macroroles in their theory. The macroroles are the participants most closely 
related to the predication. There are usually two of them, an Actor and an Undergoer, 
although this may change to one or even zero. The actor is an AGENT-type participant; 
it is the driving force behind the process referred to by the verb. Van Valin and LaPolla 
note that not only AGENT participant roles may be eligible for this function but also 
EXPERIENCER, INSTRUMENT, RECIPIENT, SOURCE or FORCE. They most 
often translate into the syntactic function of subject of an active verb in languages like 
English and French. But let us remember that this is certainly not systematic across 
languages. The Undergoer is the entity most affected by the predication; it is therefore a  
PATIENT-type participant, but this macrorole may also be undertaken by THEME, 
RECIPIENT, SOURCE or LOCATION participant roles, in that order of preference. 
The Undergoer function usually appears as the object of an active verb. Macroroles 
therefore play a pivotal part in the transition from the semantic form of a verb to its 
syntactic realisation, and vice-versa. „Macroroles are generalizations across the argument-
types found with particular verbs which have significant grammatical consequences; it is 
they, rather than specific arguments in logical structure, that grammatical rules refer to 
primarily‟ (p.139). When assigning semantic participants to particular syntactic functions, 
the macroroles will be considered first. 
 
Having established the nature of semantic participant roles on the one hand and the 
macroroles as the priority syntactic functions on the other hand, we can now examine 
Van Valin and LaPolla‟s idea of the interface between the syntax and the semantics of 
verbs. Actually selecting which participant role will be the Actor and which will be the 
Undergoer, is not a black-and-white decision. Rather, it follows a continuum which the 
authors call the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy: 
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ACTOR        UNDERGOER 
-------------------------------------------------------------> 
     <---------------------------------------------------------  
argument  1st argument    1st argument        2nd argument argument of state 
of DO  of do‟(x,...    of pred‟(x,y)       of pred‟(x,y) pred‟(x) 
 
The participant role most likely to take on the role of Actor is an AGENT one. Then 
that Actor must be assigned a syntactic function in the sentence. The Actor-Undergoer 
Hierarchy model tells us that if the verb is an intransitive verb (a predicate involving 
agency), then the participant selected as its Actor will be assigned to the function of sole 
argument of that verb. If the verb involved is a transitive DO one, with two arguments, 
then the participant selected as Actor will take on the function of first argument for that 
verb.  
At the other end of the scale, once a participant role has been selected as Undergoer (a 
PATIENT-type is preferable), it must also be assigned a syntactic function. The 
prototypical link is between Undergoer and the sole argument of an intransitive 
pred‟verb, ie. a predicate which does not involve agency. Where the verb involved is a 2-
argument transitive predicate, the Undergoer will be assigned the function of second 
argument.1 
 
The linking process from the macrorole to a corresponding syntactic position (Van Valin 
and LaPolla call it Privileged Syntactic Argument or PSA) is not identical for every 
                                                 
1 But the assignment process is not so clearcut when we have to deal with a 2-place 
predicate. Other semantic or pragmatic influences on the sentence might lead us to select 
the position of 1st argument for the Undergoer over the Actor. This is what happens in 
an English or French passive sentence where the Undergoer appears as the subject, and 
the Actor as an oblique argument. 
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language. Whereas participant roles, and probably their mapping onto the macrorole 
functions of Actor and Undergoer according to a strict hierarchy, could be universal, 
they suggest that the interface between the macroroles and the syntax is subject to 
language-specific variations.   
 
2.4.  Givón: from case-roles to syntactic patterns  
 
In Syntax: a functional-typological approach (1984), Givón tackles „the case-marking behaviour 
of the verb‟s argument‟ (p.86). Where Van Valin and LaPolla proposed four types of 
verbs, he acknowledges three across languages: states, events and actions. In each case, 
the second argument is gradually more affected by the process, so that events are more 
likely to engender transitive clauses than states, and actions even more so than events. 
So, along with Hopper and Thompson, Givón agrees that „transitivity is a matter of 
degree‟ (p.98).  
He also bases his account of transitivity on semantic case-roles. He distinguishes the 
major case-roles like PATIENT, DATIVE and AGENT from the minor case-roles of 
BENEFACTIVE, LOCATIVE, INSTRUMENTAL and ASSOCIATIVE; later, he also 
adds the semantic roles of TIME, PURPOSE and INTENT1.  
Along with Hopper and Thompson, Givón agrees that transitivity only affects two-
argument verbs. In his model, a prototypical transitive verb presents the following 
pattern: 
 
an agent +  a verb of change  + a patient-of-change 
as subject      as object   
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The very notion of a prototypical transitive pattern allows for less prototypical 
alternatives. Either the case of the object (i.e. PATIENT), or the case of the subject  
(i.e. AGENT) may change. As far as our study is concerned, only the former will be of 
relevance.  
According to Givón, concepts such as humanity, animacy, agentiveness and volitionality 
all affect the transitive process. He argues that the core issue is saliency, a notion not 
unlike Hopper and Thompson‟s background/foreground distinction or Grimshaw‟s 
prominence. In pragmatic terms, the more salient the participant is within the process (or 
the more affected it is by the process), the more chances it has of being interpreted either 
as the subject of that process or as its transitively direct object.  
 
The distinction between transitively direct and transitively indirect objects is therefore 
very simple in Givón‟s terms: the IO is „not an affected patient‟ (p.109). It is then more 
likely to be introduced by a suffix or prefix (in the case of French or English, a 
preposition). This is akin to saying that an IO is less topical or salient than a DO. 
Certain semantic roles are more eligible for the function of IO than the prototypical 
PATIENT-direct object: they are the LOCATIVE, the DATIVE, the ASSOCIATIVE, 
the BENEFACTIVE and the INSTRUMENTAL.  
 
„[...] we discussed various types of participants in states, events and actions. We defined 
them as the most common semantic case-roles found in human language. While these 
case-roles are considered universal, it is not the case that all languages code them 
syntactically in the same way‟ (p.135). This is in simple terms the issue with which we are 
                                                                                                                                            
1 This classification only very partially recoups that of Van Valin and LaPolla, but neither 
they nor Givón are striving for an exhaustive catalogue of all semantic cases, as this is 
clearly a matter of personal interpretation. 
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concerning ourselves. Givón calls it „the functional dilemma‟ and gives it the following 
definition: 
 
„Functional dilemma in objectization: 
“How to express simultaneously the semantic case-role of an argument and its pragmatic 
case-role as secondary topic (i.e. DO)” ‟ (p.169). 
 
There is interplay between a semantic level involving participants with certain semantic 
case-roles, and a pragmatic level which determines the syntactic functions of subject and 
direct object. Givón‟s originality is to introduce the notion of pragmatics in order to 
explain the syntax-semantics interface. What he calls subject and direct object in a 
grammatical terminology, he also calls primary and secondary clause topics in a pragmatic 
perspective. This is actually the same as the concepts of macroroles defined by Van Valin 
and LaPolla.1  
How do semantic roles translate into direct (or indirect) object then ? Objectisation 
prototypically selects a PATIENT role as the direct object of a verb‟s process. If none 
can be found, promotion to DO must take place; this is defined as „the placing, by 
whatever grammatical means, of a non-patient object into the position of direct object, 
whose grammatical coding (most commonly by morphology) is otherwise characteristic 
of patient objects‟ (p.172).  
There is, according to Givón, a „hierarchy of access to direct objecthood‟:  
DAT/BEN > PAT > LOC > INSTR/ASSOC > MANN 
 
                                                 
1
 Of course, Givón‟s choice of the terms „subject‟ and „direct object‟ to refer to the 
macroroles, is only acceptable to the extent that the macroroles actually translate into 
those grammatical functions. We know that this is not always the case across languages. 
But Givón is aiming at simplicity via his prototypical model.  
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However we are now faced with a paradox: in a process of promotion to DO, can the 
participant afford to lose its semantic marking (i.e. the preposition that usually indicates 
its semantic case-role) ? The issue is clarity: wherever the verb‟s meaning is semantically 
linked to that of the participant being promoted, the latter‟s semantic value should not be 
lost, and promotion will not engender confusion; alternatively, if there are no other 
preposition-less participants in the clause, then again, confusion will be avoided and 
promotion to DO by loss of the preposition, can take place without fear of losing the 
semantic specificity of the participant being promoted. It is paramount in any case to 
preserve the semantic case-role of the participants since, „by losing their original semantic 
case-role markers to become DO, non-patient objects increase their probability of being 
semantically misinterpreted‟ (p. 182). 
Givón insists on every language‟s need to balance case-marking with case-differentiation. 
Case-differentiation is a semantic concept that refers to the obviousness with which we 
can identify the semantic role of a participant; case-marking is a morphosyntactic concept 
referring to the way in which a language encodes case-differentiation. „Case-marking 
systems [...] are not made to explicitly mark every argument, but rather _ ideally_ to 
maximally differentiate between arguments in actual sentential contexts‟ (p.184).  
It is not always necessary to explicit a participant‟s semantic role  with morphosyntactic 
indicators such as prepositions. A principle of economy actually dictates that, if the 
context of the sentence poses no ambiguity, this should be avoided. 
 
 
Hopper and Thompson, Van Valin and LaPolla, and Givón all believe in a set of linking 
rules that would interface the syntax of a predicate with the semantic values of its 
arguments. Langacker provides a cognitive basis for this approach. How it would work in 
the detail is nevertheless a point of debate. Hopper and Thompson completely avoid the 
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issue; instead they highlight the values of both predicates and arguments that exert an 
influence over transitivity. Van Valin and LaPolla refer to an intermediate plane they call 
the macroroles; those are the two arguments most closely related to the predicate, 
although the nature of this „closeness‟ is not clearly explained. Givón also uses an 
intermediate level, that of pragmatics. The notion of saliency he introduces strongly 
echoes Hopper and Thompson‟s foregrounding, Langacker‟s chain reactions and even 
Grimshaw‟s prominence, as seen in chapter 1. But we are not yet satisfied as to how 
those prominence relations among arguments may translate into syntax.  
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Chapter 3: How are argument structure and transitivity determined (II): 
       approaches from lexical-semantics 
 
 
More recently, researchers in the field of lexical-semantics have challenged the notion of 
an exclusive and systematic interface between the domains of syntax and semantics. They 
are now re-examining the whole area of argument structure from the point of view of an 
individual verb‟s lexical characteristics. 
 
3.1. Wechsler: restricted and unrestricted arguments 
 
In his 1995 study The Semantic basis of Argument Structure, Wechsler reinvestigates the 
theories of the syntax-semantics interface. He identifies two main approaches: one is 
through a set of thematic roles, which must be universal. Givón‟s case-roles, Van Valin 
and LaPolla‟s participants hail from that school. But Wechsler points out to the difficulty 
of defining a universal set of thematic-roles, as we already have in chapter 2. The other is 
through the categorisation of the predicates themselves into different types, as was 
attempted by Jackendoff (1990). The theory of Aktionsart (from which Van Valin and 
LaPolla also drew inspiration) had already explored the same territory. 
 
Both approaches seem too complex to Wechsler. He claims to be able to account for the 
determination of all cases of argument structures in three simple steps only. 
Step 1 seeks ordering rules to determine the order in which the arguments appear in the a-
structure. As neither thematic roles, nor classification of predicates has succeeded yet in 
finding a complete explanation, Wechsler ventures that „[…] the appropriate semantic 
basis involves primitives of an even more abstract and general sort, and that there are 
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very few in number. Indeed there may only be one or two of them‟ (p.2). However he 
does not go as far as identifying them. 
The second step identifies semantically restricted complements: some argument NPs are 
specifically marked in a language as belonging to certain semantic relations. They are 
identified by case-marking, or with a preposition for instance. Other argument NPs are 
unrestricted. In as far as it considers NPs individually, and since the semantic relations 
that hold between them and their markers may be part of their lexical entries, there is a 
strong possibility that the notion of restriction of arguments is lexically based. 
Thirdly, the isomorphy condition also concerns the order of arguments. It explains how 
unrestricted (i.e. unmarked) arguments must remain in the same slot as was determined 
by their thematic role, whereas restricted arguments can move around the sentence, since 
their marker makes it easier to identify the semantic relations they enter in. Unrestricted 
arguments only have their position within the a-structure to convey such information. If 
they switch place, they lose that vital link and their meaning is obscured. This notion is 
reminiscent of English ditransitive sentences. 
 
With his approach, Wechsler gets rid of some cumbersome labels and rigid linking rules, 
but general categorisations are fading. On the one hand, thematic roles are still linking to 
argument slots. But on the other hand, we find a seemingly endless series of semantic 
relations, signalled by particular markers in each case, for each individual NP. Effectively, 
Wechsler has reintroduced the notion of lexical specificity into the determination of 
argument structure.  
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3.2. Gawron: a new look at oblique complements 
 
In his theory, Wechsler refers to the work of Gawron while dealing with oblique 
complements. According to Wechsler, oblique complements are restricted (and often 
marked by a preposition in French or in English). They are also outside the argument 
structure of the predicate, but may be linked to one of its arguments. For example, in the 
sentence 
 
(3.1)  Try to avoid smearing the drawing with charcoal 
 
the NP the drawing is the internal argument of the predicate smearing, but with charcoal  is 
not a direct argument of that predicate. Instead, it is an oblique argument linked to the 
internal argument the drawing. 
 
But how do oblique arguments acquire their markers ? Gawron estimates that „a 
preposition has semantic content, rather than simply tagging a complement of the verb‟ 
(id, p.66). Take the preposition for: „ [it] occurs with a class of verbs having to do with 
desire: wish, hope, pray, ask, long, try, hunger and yearn. If we posit a relation DESIRE which 
is a component for all these verbs, and use DESIRE as the lexical relation for one 
meaning of the preposition for, then for will be eligible to mark arguments with any of 
them. The Argument Principle does not require us to do so; it merely licenses the 
subcategorization as a possible valence for the grammar‟ (Gawron, 1986, p.344).     
In essence, if one semantic value of the preposition is compatible with one semantic 
value of the verb, then both can co-occur. They will not necessarily do so: for instance, 
English uses the phrase to yearn for but the prepositionless verb to desire.  
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„This means that the direct/oblique distinction cannot be derived from the semantics but 
must be lexically stipulated, at least in some cases‟ (p.69). There would be in effect two 
types of oblique arguments: one that would be determined by the predicate within the 
confines of its a-structure; and one that would emanate from a special semantic bond 
between the verb and the preposition itself. The latter could only be stipulated in the 
verb‟s lexical entry, making the determination of argument structure at least partially 
lexically-based. 
 
3.3.  Levin: looking at diathesis alternations 
 
English verb classes and alternations (1993) is a comprehensive work by Beth Levin which 
classifies over 5000 English verbs into semantic categories determined by their syntactic 
behaviour. „This work is guided by the assumption that the behaviour of a verb, 
particularly with respect to the expression and interpretation of its arguments, is to a 
large extent determined by its meaning. Thus verb behaviour can be used effectively to 
probe for linguistically relevant pertinent aspects of verb meaning‟ (p.1). Unlike any of 
the authors we have seen so far, Levin courageously takes a stand and places semantics 
before syntax. 
 
Working backwards so to speak, Levin analyses the syntactic behaviour of English verbs, 
in particular the alternations they allow between different syntactic constructions. She 
then formulates hypotheses as to the semantic reasons that motivate the different 
constructions for a given verb. For instance, she proposes that the middle transitivity 
alternation (or alternation between a middle form and a transitive form for the same 
predicate) is available only to those verbs whose meaning involves causing a change of state. 
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She also famously examined the alternations of the four verbs cut, hit, touch and break. She 
came to the conclusion that touch, hit and cut must display common semantic features 
since they all allow the conative alternation (where the second argument is introduced by 
the preposition at); she termed them verbs of contact. But they also entered into different 
alternations, and were therefore to be considered variants of the common semantic core. 
„Touch is a pure verb of contact, hit is a verb of contact by motion, cut is a verb of 
causing a change of state by moving something into contact with the entity that changes 
state, and break is a pure verb of change of state‟ (p.10).   
„If the distinctive behaviour of verb classes with respect to diathesis alternations arises 
from their meaning, any class of verbs whose members pattern together with respect to 
diathesis alternations should be a semantically coherent class: its members should share 
at least some aspect of meaning‟ (p.14). 
 
Levin classifies dozens of verb alternations in her work, but we are specifically concerned 
with those diathesis alternations that involve a shift between a direct transitive argument 
structure and an indirect transitive argument structure. For example, the conative 
alternation involves one structure in which the preposition at is used to introduce the 
second argument of the sentence, and another structure where the preposition is 
dropped. Sentences such as He hit the door and He hit at the door are alternatives, and a 
semantic interpretation would distinguish between them on the basis of a notion of goal: 
the door is the goal towards which the hit is directed in He hit at the door, whereas goal is 
irrelevant in He hit the door, therefore the preposition can be dropped. 
Other examples of preposition-drop alternations can be found with other types of 
prepositions, notably locative prepositions. The horse can jump the fence is a variant for The 
horse can jump over the fence; She walked around in circles is a variant of She walked in circles, etc. 
With preposition-drop alternations are also frequent with verbs of social interaction: one 
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can say We met with them yesterday as well as We met them yesterday: the difference seems to be 
one of intensionality.  
We must also note alternations concerning ditransitive constructions. The dative 
alternation is one such: we already know from chapter 1 that a construction of the type 
Bríd gave the keys to Paul will easily translate into French, but its double object variant Bríd 
gave Paul the keys will not, as French does not allow double direct objects. What semantic 
motivation can be found for such an alternation should prove crucial in explaining 
English/French contrasts. 
 
Levin‟s work on diathesis alternations reveals an approach to argument structure and 
transitivity based on the observation of individual verbs, in other terms, a lexical 
approach. Verbs can pattern together into conflation classes, based on the alternations 
they have in common. But those diathesis alternations are determined by the semantic 
roles of the arguments, which are themselves a reflection of the individual semantic 
values contained within the verbs‟ own lexical entries.  
 
3.4.  Pinker: furthering the lexical-semantics approach 
 
In Learnability and cognition: the acquisition of argument structure (1989), Pinker discusses 
„Baker‟s paradox‟ or how do children acquire the argument structures of verbs, when 
they cannot benefit from much negative evidence in the discourses they are exposed to ? 
In other words, how do we know what is acceptable or what is not, in terms of argument 
structures, if we are not told so explicitly ?  
 
A-structure is only part of a verb‟s lexical entry according to Pinker. The latter should 
also comprise morphological and phonological information about the predicate, its part-
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of-speech category and its meaning or semantic structure. Any modification in this 
information will yield a new lexical entry, effectively corresponding to a new word. 
Therefore, Pinker assumes that „the same verb used with two different argument 
structures actually consists of two distinct lexical entries sharing a morphological root 
and components of their semantic structures‟ (p.71-72). Note that certain semantic 
components only can be shared by the two words in this view, because the correlation 
between the semantic structure of a word and its syntactic structure is so close that 
modifying the one automatically modifies the other. Therefore no two words could share 
every component of their meaning, and behave differently from the point of view of 
their argument structure. If two verbs were to have the same semantic entry, they would 
be one and the same.   
 
„Semantic structures are mapped onto syntactic argument structures, thanks to linking 
rules, so when the verb‟s meaning changes, its argument structure changes too, as an 
automatic consequence‟ (p.63). Pinker deems that those linking rules are systematic.  
Although his classification of verbs is somewhat different from those we have seen 
before, what he proposes here has already been observed elsewhere and can be 
paraphrased as follows: 
- Rule 1 states that an AGENT should take on the role of subject, and this should be 
systematically applied where a form of causative verb is concerned. 
- Rule 2 states that the PATIENT of such a causative verb should be linked to the object 
position; these two rules taken together are very reminiscent of Givón‟ prototypical 
model of transitivity. 
- Rule 3 states that the THEME of a state verb or of a motion verb should preferably be 
linked to the subject position, or if this is not possible, to the object position. This is 
compatible with analyses such as Givón‟s, and Van Valin and Lapolla‟s: the former stated 
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that the AGENT would assume the subject position over a THEME, and the latter that 
the PATIENT would do so, if the case arose.  
- Rule 4 states that the GOAL in a directed motion process should be linked to the verb 
indirectly, via use of the preposition to. This is not very surprising for English. 
- Rule 5 states that the THEME in a transfer of possession process, should take the 
position of second object, which is the same as saying that all transfers of possession can 
yield ditransitive constructions. 
 
Those mechanisms are much more constraining than any approach we had explored so 
far. Pinker acknowledges that, on the topic of linking rules, he is somewhat at odds with 
researchers such as Jackendoff, Rappaport and Levin. The principal disagreement centers 
around the issue of how many linking rules are needed to account for the whole area of 
argument structures. However Pinker himself accepts that there are narrow-range rules, 
next to the broad-range rules he has proposed. The broad-range rules are „classwise and 
property-predicting‟, i.e. they pertain to (semantic) classes of verbs, whereas the narrow-
range rules are „itemwise and existence-predicting‟: narrow-range rules will only apply to 
specific lexical items, and will only predict which argument structures are possible for a 
particular verb.  
 
Is there redundancy in this approach ? Ideally, Pinker would like to see all narrow-range 
rules replaced by broad-range rules that could encompass all the smaller rules below 
them, edicting mechanisms for whole classes of verbs rather than for individual verbs. 
„First, the broad-range rules determine what all the narrow-range rules have in common 
[...]. Second, the motivation for why certain subclasses alternate and others don‟t is 
provided by the broad-range rules‟ (p.152). On the other hand, there is no evidence that 
what seems to be the shortest route to solving Baker‟s paradox, is actually the favoured 
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way of first language learners: it is entirely plausible that children learn argument 
structures through individual verbs, and accumulate narrow-range rules. Moreover, 
Pinker has found some evidence that „narrow-range rules can be sensitive to the presence 
of the full set of arguments accompanying a verb, including optional path constituents 
[oblique arguments]‟(p.227). For example, two narrow-range rules will be needed to yield 
She rolled the ball into the box, and She rolled the ball. Although Pinker is confident that a 
broad-range rule can capture this alternation, narrow-range rules can provide certain 
useful details. 
 
What this distinction between narrow- and broad-range rules reveals nevertheless, is the 
likeliness (already strongly supported by Levin‟s work) that verbs can be conflated into 
semantic classes that will demonstrate evidence of common argument structures and 
alternations. Such conflation classes are to be organised around a thematic core: „a 
thematic core is the schematisation of a type of event or relationship that lies at the core 
of the meaning of a class of possible verbs‟ (p.73). All verbs included in a particular 
conflation class will share that core feature and display similar argument structure 
patterns. Conversely, such conflation classes can be used to explain why some verbs do 
not participate in certain alternations for instance: an explanation could be that „such 
verbs are clearly ruled out because they are cognitively incompatible with a thematic core 
associated with the argument structure‟ (p.98).   
 
Pinker proposes that argument structure lies at the crossroads of the three domains of 
syntax, semantics and the lexicon. On the one hand, he clearly stipulates that a-structure 
is part of a verb‟s lexical entry, confirming our suspicion that close links exist between 
syntax and the lexicon. And on the other hand, he too believes in conflation classes 
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organised around core semantic values, in other words he endorses the concept of a 
syntax-semantics interface. 
 
3.5. Lexical-semantics and cognitive linguistics 
 
Here again we are able to draw some interesting parallels between a school of semantics 
and cognitive research. Both lexical semantics and cognitive linguistics display a similar 
approach to words in as much as semantic values are perceived as an intrinsic part of any 
lexical item. In turn, those values influence the use of words by speakers in a discourse 
context. For lexical semanticists, semantic values pertaining to an individual lexical item 
are encoded in its l-entry. They trigger linking rules to certain syntactic behaviours; for 
instance, in the case of predicates, lexical-semantic values directly link to argument slots. 
For cognitive linguists, the semantic values attributed to lexical items also determine their 
selection in sentences. This cognitive view really is the foundation of the lexical-
semantics approach. It explains how a word is chosen for use in a sentence in the first 
place, because of the semantic values it encapsulates. Then lexical-semantics can analyse 
how those values influence its syntactic role within the sentence. 
 
With this reasoning, cognitive research has been particularly adept at describing the 
semanticity and behaviour of prepositions. Along with Langacker‟s ideas as seen in our 
second chapter, this school is part of the „prominence‟ view of cognitive linguistics. 
Whereas Langacker used the concept of prominence to offer a cognitive explanation of 
transitivity, other cognitivists base their analyses of prepositions on the dichotomy of 
figure vs. ground. To them, human perception is constantly striving to distinguish 
prominent objects from background objects. Prominent objects are known as „figures‟ 
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that stand against a „ground‟ of less important objects. Language focuses essentially on 
the description of figures.  
In their opinion, the role of prepositions is first and foremost to convey information 
about location. Where location and possibly movement, are involved, cognitive linguists 
will use the terms „trajector‟ for a moving figure, and „landmark‟ for its motionless 
ground. A preposition‟s basic locative value is expressed by means of an image schema _ 
a visual representation of its prototypical use, as it is perceived by our senses. But 
prepositions tend to extend their applications beyond their locative basis, into other 
cognitive domains. That is why its central schema gives rise to less prototypical 
„elaborations‟, and even to metaphorical extensions of a given preposition. 
 
Famous examples of prepositions‟ cognitive analyses as reported by Ungerer and Schmid 
(1996) include OVER by Lakoff (1987) and OUT by Lindner (1982). We shall add the 
French preposition A by Vandeloise (1991) in order to demonstrate that this particular 
school of cognitive linguistics is not confined to the English language. 
Basic definitions for those prepositions go as follows: 
- OVER: „a trajectory moving along a path that is above the landmark and goes 
from one end of the landmark to the other and beyond‟ (Ungerer and Schmid, 
1996, p.162)  
An example is found in the sentence 
 
(3.2) The plane flew over 
 
Here the plane is the trajector flying over a fixed landmark, which is understood to be 
the Speaker. 
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- OUT: the trajector moves in such a way that, eventually, it is no longer within the 
boundaries of the landmark 
  
(3.3) She went out 
 
This sentence sees a trajector she moving out of a landmark area such as the room. 
- A: a trajector is moving towards a landmark so distant that its shape, size and 
characteristics are not visible (in an image schema, the landmark is represented as 
a dot). There is a strong sense of a path leading to that landmark. 
 
(3.4) L‟ empereur  est  à  la  plage  
  The  emperor  is  at  the  beach 
  „The emperor is at the beach‟ 
 
Here the Speaker describes an imaginary path followed by his eye in order to locate 
the emperor at a distant landmark of no definite physical characteristics. The 
landmark clearly is the beach, but the trajector is not the emperor: it is the Speaker 
himself. 
Elaborations on those basic meanings include such examples as 
 
(3.5) Sam drove over the bridge 
(3.6) He picked out two pieces of candy 
 
In the first example, the basic image schema for OVER is slightly modified in as much as 
there is now physical contact between the trajector Sam and the landmark the bridge. 
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In the second example, the landmark candy is no longer construed as a homogeneous 
entity, but as a group of individual items. Such variations on the core locative meanings 
of prepositions are numerous. 
Finally, those core values can be further extended when used in conjunction with 
metaphors. In the example below, the central schema for OVER is superimposed on two 
commonly used metaphors: one refers to life as a journey, and the other sees problems as 
obstacles in one‟s path. 
 
(3.7) Harry still hasn‟t got over his divorce 
 
We are now far from the initial locative sense of OVER, but the image used here implies 
that the trajector Harry must overcome the landmark divorce in much the same manner as 
the plane used to fly overhead in (3.2). 
 
Aside from Gawron, who in his conception of the selection of prepositions implied that 
argument structure at large was determined at the level of lexical semantics, all the other 
linguists reviewed in this section used a model of interface between semantics and syntax. 
However they all found that those models could never account for the totality of 
argument structures (therefore, of transitive constructions). In all cases, reference was 
made to a level of interface between the lexicon and semantics. Semantic values were 
always attributed directly to the predicates, or to their arguments. Cognitive linguistics 
helped us strengthen this case by providing information about how the semantic values 
attributed to prepositions for instance, influenced their use in discourse. As a component 
of the words themselves _ of their lexical entry_, every time the semantic values are 
accessed in order to determine at least part of the syntactic forms of predicates, a direct 
link is established between the lexicon and syntax. 
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Chapter 4:  The determination of transitivity status 
 
4.1. The theoretical viewpoint 
 
Our overview of current approaches to the problem of determination of argument 
structure has opposed two schools. On the one hand, some linguists are looking for an 
answer in the links that would bond together the syntactic and semantic levels of a 
predicate: they are seeking to establish the rules of an interface. On the other hand, other 
researchers are investigating the direct links that would exist between syntax and the 
lexicon: some syntactic patterns would not be attached to the semantic values of the 
predicate, but encoded in its l-entry. Both approaches find some elements of justification 
in those cognitive views of language that favour prominence as the basis for the selection 
and ordering of lexical items in a sentence. Whether a syntax-semantics interface would 
use an intermediate plane made of macroroles, as proposed by VanValin and LaPolla, or 
indeed whether the principle is founded at all, is not our direct concern in this study, but 
looking at transitivity may imply for us to make up our mind on the issue of the 
determination of argument structure as a whole. So why and how is a status of indirect 
transitivity conferred upon certain arguments ?     
The first school would assume the existence of a semantic value for each preposition 
used to introduce indirect transitive arguments, or even the notion of a unique semantic 
value to encompass the very notion of indirect transitivity itself. The second school 
would treat each predicate individually and assume a status of indirect transitivity to be 
part of its lexical make-up. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in 
Pinker‟s, Levin‟s and Wechsler‟s work, there is always the possibility for both to co-exist. 
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We will seek to validate either (or maybe both) „theories‟ through our data analysis. At 
every stage, we should keep in mind a few notions that have re-occurred through the 
literature. 
Firstly, prominence relations seem paramount in the ordering of arguments. For us, this 
means in particular that a second argument is less salient than a first argument, but more 
salient than a non-argument. We might wonder how this hierarchy may affect the issue 
of direct vs. indirect transitivity as well.  
Secondly, we must remember at all times that arguments correspond to participants to 
which certain semantic values have been attributed. Some of these values recur in the 
determination process and must be paid particular attention to. 
Finally, the selection of transitivity status may not only be a problem of case-marking, 
but also of case-differentiation. Every marked argument should see its marking 
motivated by semanticity, and the choice of preposition might give us a clue as to which 
semantic values are at stake. But conversely, an unmarked argument might not 
necessarily be devoid of semanticity: it may simply be suppressing its markers for the 
sake of economy.  In our data, we must be careful in attributing semantic values to the 
participants that act as arguments, be they direct or indirect.  
 
In a nutshell, there are three steps to the question of how indirect transitivity is 
determined: 
- 1 concerns the overall determination of the predicate‟s a-structure; 
- 2 is the actual selection of indirect versus direct transitivity for the second 
argument; 
- 3 relates to the choice of a preposition where indirect transitivity has been 
selected. 
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Although step 2 constitutes our topic, it can hardly be examined in isolation from steps 1 
and 3.   
 
4.2. The data: a study of interlingual differences in a-structures 
 
Both the theory of the syntax-semantics interface and the theory of lexical-semantics 
assume that languages analyse the semantic values contained within/ associated with 
verbal items, in order to determine the syntactic form of their a-structure. If we observed 
verbs with an assumed identical meaning in two different languages such as English and 
French, but with different syntactic patterns, especially in regard to their transitivity 
status, we would be in a position to explore this hypothesis. Why should verbs of 
identical meaning behave differently from the point of view of their transitivity across 
languages ? Let us remember at this point that the transitivity issue has long impressed 
linguists by its remarkable cross-linguistic consistency. Therefore the data we are about 
to investigate in this study should be considered exceptional behaviour, rather than the 
norm.  
 
The data we will use presents a list of verbs that behave in a direct transitive fashion in 
English, but in an indirect transitive manner in French. They introduce a preposition 
between the verb and the object in French, where there is none in English.  
The verbs were selected using Levin‟s English verb classes and alternations (1993) as a starting 
point because of its extensive classification of verbs. Personal observations were also 
added. We retained only those verbs that showed interlingual difference in transitivity 
when used with a noun phrase as object, as inclusion of verbal objects would have 
created a much larger and much more complex database. Were the present study to lead 
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to hypotheses testing in the future, we also narrowed down the list to verbs commonly 
used and easily understood by an average language learner of intermediate level. 
All utterances were taken from or inspired by the Collins Cobuild English Language 
Dictionary (1987), which draws its examples from authentic English language texts with 
the help of a concordancer. The data was then translated into French. Only verbs that 
could translate as one word were retained: verbal phrases such as faire pression sur quelqu’un 
for to press someone, or aller bien à quelqu’un for to suit someone were dismissed. 
The data includes 20 verbs:  
 
(D1)  to answer/ répondre à 
(D2)  to ask/ demander à 
(D3)  to change/ changer de 
(D4)  to decide/ décider de  
(D5)  to divorce/ divorcer de 
(D6)  to doubt/ douter de 
(D7)  to enjoy/ jouir de  
(D8)  to escape/ échapper à 
(D9)  to fax/ faxer à 
(D10)  to forgive/ pardonner à 
(D11) to leave/ partir de  
(D12) to obey/ obéir à - to disobey/ désobéir à 
(D13)  to phone/ téléphoner à 
(D14) to press/ appuyer sur 
(D15) to renounce/ renoncer à 
(D16)  to resemble/ ressembler à 
(D17)  to resist/ résister à 
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(D18) to suit/ convenir à 
(D19)  to telegraph/ télégraphier à 
(D20)  to value/ tenir à 
 
Our appendix contains prototypical examples of those verbs using an NP as second 
argument. They are all direct transitive in English, and indirect transitive in French.1 2 
We have taken a decision not to include French pronominal constructions with se _ when 
they occurred for certain verbs_ in the database: thus se décider à (to decide) and s’échapper 
de (to escape) are not listed in the data itself, as they present both syntactic and semantic 
variations in relation to the core verbs from which they are formed. But we are 
nevertheless going to investigate pronominal verbs briefly.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Translation of the English verbs into French can sometimes lead to different solutions. 
For instance, to value can be translated both as évaluer (a directly transitive verb), and tenir 
à, as we have used in our data; both translations here correspond to different meanings 
of the verb. To enjoy knows at least four translations, depending on context; we have 
retained jouir de for its indirect transitive construction. We opted for the translation of 
authentic English utterances into French, rather than the direct use of authentic French 
utterances different from the English ones, since this approach facilitates a comparative 
study between the two languages. 
 
2
 We have already signalled in chapter 1 the difficulty of identifying arguments and non-
arguments in relation to a predicate. While searching for utterances to illustrate the use of 
our data verbs in their syntactic context, we arbitrarily followed the entries given in two 
dictionaries, the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1987) for the English verbs, 
and Le Petit Robert - Dictionnaire de la Langue française (1995) for the French verbs, as 
debating the participation of a phrase into a verb‟s a-structure is not our purpose here. 
The reader may find however that he/she disagrees with the syntactic frames we have 
retained to typify each item‟s a-structure, as they may appear incomplete. Why not allow 
the verb renounce a V + DO + IO frame when one can say to renounce something for 
something/someone ? Because our reference dictionary did not list that particular syntactic 
frame for to renounce, thereby indicating that the argument for something/someone was to be 
considered as periphery. Matters of lexicology are well beyond our scope here, and we 
contented ourselves with V + DO constructions for English and V + IO constructions 
for French, as this was sufficient (and simpler) for our study. But we duly note that the 
matter is always ambiguous.  
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4.3. Direct vs. indirect transitivity: the case of pronominal verbs  
 
In many Romance languages, a particle traditionally classified as a pronoun, is used in 
conjunction with certain verbs to highlight semantic characteristics of the process such as 
reflexivity and reciprocity. In French, that particle takes the basic form se in the infinitive 
and it is thought to act as object to the verb. But as it never appears with any preposition, 
it is intriguing to consider whether se is a direct or an indirect object to its predicate.    
 
4.3.1. Is se a direct or an indirect object ?  
According to traditional grammar, French shows three types of pronominal verbs: 
- Reflexive verbs use their reflexive pronoun as direct object to the predicate. Since 
it is impossible for a French verb to be ditransitive, we assume that any other 
argument used by the predicate should be indirect. 
- Reciprocal verbs use their pronoun as indirect object; this relates to the animacy 
of the participant represented as the se pronoun, which is also the participant 
represented as the subject of the predicate. Those verbs can be followed by a 
direct argument. 
- There are also non-referring se pronouns, often related to a middle or passive 
meaning of the predicate. In those cases, pronominal and non-pronominal forms 
of the predicate will differ in meaning, whereas reflexive and reciprocal uses of 
the pronominal forms should retain the same meaning as the non-pronominal 
forms from which they are derived. 
This approach is very similar to those adopted by proponents of the syntax-semantics 
interface in argument structure. It assumes that se is the syntactic means by which 
semantic values such as reflexivity and reciprocity manifest themselves. 
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Directly conflicting this state of affairs however, there is also the assumption that a 
pronominal verb‟s transitivity status should be identical to that of its corresponding non-
pronominal form. We shall see now in analysing the pronominal forms for our data 
verbs, that this poses challenges.   
 
All the following verbs in our database displayed reflexive value in at least one of their 
pronominal forms: 
(D3)  changer (to change)   (P3)  se changer  
       (to change one‟s clothes) 
 
(D4)  décider (to decide)     (P4)  se décider pour + NP  
(to decide for + NP) 
 
(D8)  échapper (to escape)   (P8)  s‟échapper de/ par + LOC  
(to escape from/through +LOC) 
(D14)  appuyer (to press)   (P14)  s‟appuyer à/sur/contre + LOC  
           (to lean against/on/against+LOC)1 
(D20)  tenir (to hold)      (P20)  se tenir à + NP  
(to hold onto + NP) 
 
In each case, the process described is similar in both the non-pronominal and the 
pronominal forms. In the pronominal forms, the process affects primarily the participant 
represented by the se pronoun: se takes on the status of direct object. As the subject of 
the predicate also represents the same referent, it is a case of a participant, usually 
animate, operating a process upon itself: this is reflexivity. Let us note that in four out of 
                                                 
1 S’appuyer à literally translates as „to press one‟s body against‟, so we should not be fooled by the translation 
to lean on: both non-pronominal and pronominal forms of the verb refer to identical processes. 
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five cases here, the predicate can also take a further argument1, which is introduced by a 
preposition, and is therefore indirect.   
However, we find among our data some verbs which, in their reflexive form, should 
confer an indirect transitive status onto the se pronoun, with reference to their non-
pronominal a-structure. They are: 
 
(D2)  demander (to ask)    (P2)  se demander  
(to ask oneself, to wonder) 
 
(D10)  pardonner (to forgive)    (P10)  se pardonner (to forgive oneself)   
 
As one can use a phrase such as se pardonner ses fautes (to forgive oneself one‟s own 
mistakes), only (D10) pardonner may display use of a direct object in the pronominal form, 
thereby confirming the necessarily indirect status of se. (D2) se demander must be 
considered to use the se pronoun indirectly simply by virtue of meaning: since non-
pronominal and pronominal predicates here refer to identical processes, i.e. the 
relationships between the participants are of a similar nature, we must concede that, if 
the object of all those processes is indirect in the non-pronominal form, then the object 
in all pronominal forms must be indirect as well. Here semantic judgement overrides the 
crude semantic-to-syntax links established by traditional grammar. 
 
Let us see if the grammar rules are respected in relation to our verbs‟ reciprocal senses.   
We find here that verbs relating to a communication process easily confer a reciprocal 
meaning onto their pronominal form. They include: 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In (P4) se décider pour + NP (to decide for + NP) and (P20) se tenir à + NP  (to hold onto + NP), we 
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(D1)  répondre (to answer, to reply)    (P1)  se répondre  
(to reply to one another) 
(D9)  faxer  (to fax)     (P9)  se faxer (to fax one another) 
(D13)  téléphoner (to phone)    (P13)  se téléphoner  
(to phone one another) 
(D19)  télégraphier (to telegraph)  (P19)  se télégraphier  
(to telegraph one another) 
 
 
 
The se pronoun effectively is a shortcut for a process meaning „X answers Y and Y 
answers X‟, „X faxes to Y and Y faxes to X‟, etc. 
Other verbs in our data also take on reciprocal meaning in the pronominal form, as well 
as a possible reflexive meaning. They include: 
 
(D2)  demander (to ask)     (P2)  se demander (to ask one another) 
 
for which we have already observed a reflexive meaning. We can add: 
 
(D16)  ressembler (to resemble)    (P16)  se ressembler  
(to look like one another) 
 
(D18)  convenir (to suit)    (P18)  se convenir  
(to suit one another) 
 
There is no difficulty here in both participants, as represented by the subject and the se 
pronoun, acting upon one another reciprocally. The fact that se should be interpreted as 
an indirect object refers to the transitivity status of the non-pronominal forms, where the 
second argument was systematically introduced by a preposition à (see appendix for 
examples). This concurs with the „rule‟ established by traditional grammar: it stated that 
                                                                                                                                            
are certainly dealing with predicative arguments; in the other cases, the locative phrases may be 
considered as adjuncts. We will not settle this issue here.  
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all se pronouns in a reciprocal process would be construed as indirect objects of the 
predicate.  
But we must highlight the ambiguity of se:  we might wonder whether certain predicates 
use it reciprocally or reflexively. We solve the conundrum by referring to the meaning of 
the predicate once again, not by applying semantics-to-syntax rules in a blind manner.  
(P22) se demander is one of those ambiguous verbs: one can only establish whether se is 
reflexive (meaning „to ask oneself‟) or reciprocal (meaning „to ask each other‟) in context. 
The reflexive sense often corresponds to a single participant, while the reciprocal sense 
must apply to a plural use of the verb, with reference to several participants in the 
process. Therefore traditional grammar appears incomplete in its account of pronominal 
forms. 
 
Our data even offers one example of the third type of pronominalisation, the non-
referring one. There is at least one verb here that shows neither reflexive, nor reciprocal 
values in its pronominal form:     
 
(D6)  douter (to doubt)    (P6)  se douter de + NP (to suspect) 
 
As predicted by the rules, the pronominal meaning, although clearly related, differs from 
the non-pronominal one. Se is said to be an intrinsic pronoun, specific to that new 
meaning; it is not in itself a referring object pronoun.  
 
A number of verbs in our database did not even fit into any of the three pronominal 
categories; in fact, the following verbs do not pronominalise at all: 
 
(D5)  divorcer (to divorce) 
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(D7)  jouir (to enjoy) 
(D11)  partir (to leave) 
(D12) obéir (to obey) 
(D15)  renoncer (to renounce) 
(D17)  résister (to resist) 
 
Concerning reflexivity, it can easily be shown that at least five of those verbs, (D5)divorcer, 
(D7) jouir, (D12) obéir, (D15) renoncer and (D17) résister, actually refer to processes that 
necessarily take place between at least two participants: logically, they cannot reflexivise. 
And a conflictual connotation applies to all those verbs except (D7) jouir.  
Even (D11) partir implies the physical separation of both subject and object participants, 
which potentially blocks any interaction between the two. This could explain why 
reciprocity seems inapplicable here. This is not entirely true however; reciprocity is 
possible for at least four of those verbs by means of the phrase „l’un [PREP] l’autre’ 
([PREP] each other). One can use the following in French: 
 
(P5)  divorcer l‟un de l‟autre (to divorce one another) 
(P12)  obéir l‟un à l‟autre (to obey each other) 
(P15)  renoncer l‟un à l‟autre (to renounce each other) 
(P17)  résister l‟un à l‟autre (to resist one another) 
 
The use of a preposition à or de in all those cases clearly confirms that the arguments 
involved in the reciprocal process are indeed indirect. We could add at this point, 
although the case did not appear in our data analysis, that reflexivity is not the preserve 
of the se particle either. Some verbs use the phrase ‘[PREP] soi-même’ ([PREP] oneself) to 
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mark that particular value, as in ‘douter de soi-même’ (to doubt oneself). If it is not the only 
marker for reflexivity or reciprocity, we may wonder what exactly is the value of the so-
called se pronoun. Looking at non-referring pronominal verbs, we may wonder if it is a 
pronoun at all.  
 
4.3.2. Grimshaw: a lexical approach 
In an article published in 1982, Grimshaw thinks that se is not a pronoun at all, but a 
marker left on predicates by the operations of inchoativisation, reflexivisation and middle 
verb formation. It is in short a lexical marker. Grimshaw hails from the same school as 
Pinker and Levin. Working at the level of logical structure (LF), she seeks to associate 
lexical rules with (generative) grammatical forms. In her view, it is lexical rules that 
trigger the assignment of grammatical functions onto certain arguments.  
As she re-investigates traditional accounts of pronominalisation in Romance languages, 
Grimshaw manages to accommodate the three categories of pronominal verbs with three 
lexical rules. Non-referring pronominal forms are often the result of a process of 
inchoativisation of the verb; for instance, in the following transformation, the first 
example is in a causative form, and the second one is its inchoative counterpart: 
 
(4.1)  Pierrre  casse  le  verre     (4.2)  Le  verre  se casse 
Pierre  breaks  the  glass    The  glass  breaks 
  „Pierre breaks the glass‟    „The glass breaks‟ 
 
Alternatively, it is also assumed that se in Romance languages introduces what in English 
we term „middle verbs‟. Grimshaw establishes „the Middle Rule‟ to account for those 
forms. However, since se does not refer to any participant here, it is doubtful whether it 
should be conferred pronominal status at all. 
 59 
In the present study, we are more concerned with reflexive and reciprocal forms in which 
se looks like an argument of the verb. Grimshaw establishes one rule called 
Reflexivisation, to account for both phenomena. She equates reciprocity to a plural form 
of reflexivity. This assimilation is debatable however as we have already explained that 
many plural pronominal forms presented both reflexive and reciprocal interpretations. 
That said, Grimshaw‟s approach is convincing as it solves two enigmas at once: we now 
know that non-referring se is not necessarily a pronoun; and we need not concern 
ourselves with the direct/indirect issue anymore, since neither reflexive nor reciprocal se 
forms were ever arguments of the predicate.  
In this theory, se is the marker left after the a-structure of the non-pronominal form of 
the verb has been manipulated. Grimshaw sees two types of manipulations at work: in 
non-referring se, an argument has been removed, as in our examples of inchoativisation  
 
(4.1)  Pierrre  casse  le  verre     (4.2)  Le  verre  se casse 
Pierre  breaks  the  glass    The  glass  breaks 
  „Pierre breaks the glass‟    „The glass breaks‟ 
 
In reflexive and reciprocal forms, se is the marker left to indicate the binding of an 
internal argument (an object) onto the external argument of the predicate (the subject). 
We already knew that subject and se particle both referred to the same participant in 
reflexive constructions; what happens in this account, is that the predicate‟s direct object 
is bound onto its external argument. It also seems that in reciprocal structures, an 
indirect object is bound onto the subject slot.  
This is a process of detransitivisation, whereby a predicate actually reduces its valency by 
losing one argument. This phenomenon is restricted to verbs of valency 2 or more: 
where a verb initially had only one internal argument, the loss of that argument 
effectively means that its corresponding se form will be intransitive; verbs of a higher 
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valency can retain other internal arguments along with their new se marker. The hierarchy 
of the arguments will be reorganised; for instance, in reflexive a-structures, former 
indirect objects can be promoted to direct objecthood if they fill the slot vacated by the 
argument now bound onto the se marker. 
 
This rapid tour of the vast issue of pronominalisation sought out to answer one simple 
question: how does one recognise a direct from an indirect object ? The absence of any 
preposition with se singled out pronominal verbs as prime candidates for a preliminary 
investigation. Notwithstanding the doubtful pronominal status of se itself, we observed 
some interesting facts relating to the domain of transitivity. We saw that traditional 
approaches, very similar to those adopted by proponents of the syntax-semantics 
interface in argument structure, were incomplete. Se was seen as the syntactic means by 
which semantic values such as reflexivity and reciprocity were to manifest themselves. 
But since it had the same transitivity status as the argument it stood for  (it was 
sometimes a DO and sometimes an IO), the linking rules established between those 
values and the syntactic structures we call pronominal, were not absolutely consistent. 
On the other hand, Grimshaw‟s account was representative of the lexical semantics 
school of thought: verbs only pronominalised because they followed lexical rules that 
were ingrained in their lexical make-up.  
Both approaches point in the same direction however. Firstly, broad linking rules let 
through a number of individual cases: we must pay more attention to the individual 
characteristics of our data verbs. Secondly, the determination of a verb‟s transitivity 
status is closely related to its semantic values, whether those are included in that 
predicate‟s l-entry or part of a distinct network. We now need to learn more about the 
semanticity of our data verbs. 
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Chapter 5: The choice of à and de with indirect transitive                         
arguments: a semantic basis for the French prepositional system 
 
How can we determine which semantic values associate with individual predicates ? 
Since we know after Gawron, that indirect verbs select prepositions whose semanticity 
somehow reflects their own, we shall investigate the nature of the prepositions which 
accompany our French verbs. Cognitive approaches to prepositions, as seen in our 
chapter 3, should assist us in this task. We hope that by shedding light onto the process 
used by French predicates in selecting a preposition, we will be able to determine what 
undermines the direct vs. indirect dichotomy. All the verbs in our data appear with either 
à or de. We will therefore concentrate on those two prepositions.   
 
5.1. Proposal for a semantically motivated system for the determination of 
prepositions with indirect transitive arguments in French 
 
5.1.1. Examples of verbs using the preposition ‘à’ to introduce an indirect object 
In our selection of examples, the most prominent and consistent group contains verbs of 
communication such as (D2) demander „to ask‟, (D1) répondre „to answer‟ and  
(D13) téléphoner „to phone‟. Invariably, the communication processes described here entail 
the participation of a recipient for the message. Invariably in French, that recipient is an 
argument of the verb introduced by the preposition à .  
 
(D2b)  “Combien de  langues  parlez- vous ?”     
             How many     languages  speak   you(SG)    
  „ How many languages do you speak ?  
 
  demanda-t-il à  la  jeune   fille 
  asked         he   to  the  young   girl 
          he asked the young girl‟ 
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(D1d)  Réponds   à  ton  père !  
          Answer    to your   father 
  „Answer your father !‟ 
(D13b) Je suis  retourné  à    l‟   hôtel   pour   téléphoner   à  Jenny 
          I    PAST  went back  to   the   hotel   to       phone         to  Jenny 
          „I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny‟ 
 
In (D2b), the communication verb demanda „asked‟ has two arguments: an external 
argument il „he‟ acting as its subject, and an internal argument la jeune fille „the young girl‟ 
introduced by the preposition à; that makes it an indirect object. A la jeune fille „to the 
young girl‟ refers to the recipient of the message sent through the predicate demander „to 
ask‟. In (D1d) the verb réponds „answer‟ in the imperative form only has one argument, 
the indirect object à ton père „(to) your father‟, which also represents the potential recipient 
of the answer. In (D13b), although the communication verb téléphoner „to phone‟ is part 
of an infinitival clause, it still has one internal argument, introduced by the preposition à 
and posing as the recipient of the phone call. 
 
 - Animacy 
There are really three types of communication verbs in our selection: the basic verbs of 
communication like (D2) demander „to ask‟ and (D1) répondre „to answer‟; the verbs of 
communication using a technical device such as (D9) faxer „to fax‟, (D19) télégraphier „to 
telegraph‟ and (D13) téléphoner „to phone‟; and the ex-verbs of communication (verbs that 
originally referred to verbal processes, but have evolved towards other meanings): those 
are (D10) pardonner „to forgive‟, (D12) obéir/désobéir „to obey/to disobey‟ and (D15) renoncer 
„to renounce‟. 
 
(D9f)  Elle   a         faxé  la  mauvaise  nouvelle  à  son  frère 
          She    PAST    faxed    the  bad          news        to her   brother 
  „She faxed the bad news to her brother‟ 
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(D19d) Il  avait  oublié   de  télégraphier  à  la  veuve 
          He  had  forgotten  to  telegraph          to  the  widow 
  „He had forgotten to telegraph the widow‟ 
 
(D10d) Ils      avaient  pardonné  à  leur  hôte 
            They   had      forgiven         to  their   host 
    „They had forgiven their host‟ 
 
All of those verbs have, as part of their a-structure, an argument introduced by the 
preposition à. That recipient must be capable of comprehension towards the message it 
is being sent; therefore it is no surprise to find out that à introduces an animate 
participant. There are two notable exceptions however. 
 
(D12d) Il    ne        leur        est  jamais   venu à l‟esprit 
  It   NEG  to them     PAST   never    occurred             
          „It never occurred to them  
 
  qu‟   ils    pouvaient   désobéir  à  leurs  parents 
  that  they    could   disobey       to their   parents    
  that they could disobey their parents‟ 
 
(D12b) Les  troupes rechignaient  à  obéir  aux   ordres 
           The  troops   were reluctant  to  obey     to the    orders 
  „The troops were reluctant to obey orders‟ 
 
The predicates (D12) obéir „to obey‟ and (D12) désobéir „to disobey‟ do not see a recipient 
in their indirect objects à leurs parents „(to) their parents‟ and aux ordres „(to the) orders‟; 
those arguments in fact represent the senders of the message. In this case the recipients 
ils „they‟ and les troupes „the troops‟ actually take on the roles of subject. By virtue of the 
principle of foregrounding/ saliency/ prominence we know to be operating at the basis 
of the ordering of arguments, we must assume that those particular predicates emphasise 
how a message is received, rather than how it is sent. 
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If we are to follow cognitive beliefs on semantics, we should soon find certain extended 
meanings of the „animacy‟ value. By extended, cognitive linguists mean that concrete 
notions such as animacy _ which is based here on an observable quality, the autonomy of 
movement of the recipient _ can be applied to participants that our senses would not 
normally perceive as prime candidates for that particular value. 
 
(D15b) Nous  avons  renoncé  à  l‟ usage  de  la  force 
           We      have     renounced  to  the  use     of      the force    
  „We have renounced the use of force  
 
  pour  régler  notre  différend  
  to       settle    our      dispute  
  to settle our dispute‟ 
 
In (D12b) and (D15b), the indirect object introduced by the preposition à1 is inanimate.  
It can be argued that in (D12b), the orders represent an act of speech carried out by an 
animate entity, and that the argument aux ordres „(to the) orders‟ is therefore a 
metaphorical extension of the principle of animacy. But the verb (D15) renoncer „to 
renounce‟ only allows one inanimate (and indirect) argument. It is a paradox of its 
etymological evolution that the latinate renuntiare, meaning „to state as a response‟, shifted 
from being a pure predicate of verbal communication, to being a psych-verb referring to 
a mental, even emotional, process. However, as the nature of its argument changed from 
animate recipient to inanimate theme, the preposition à survived. Nowadays it looks 
more like an archaism than a truly motivated marker.     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In example (D15b), the preposition à is contracted with the definite article les to form the word aux. 
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 - Distance 
Other verbs using the preposition à to introduce their second argument include  
(D8) échapper „to escape‟ and (D17) résister „to resist‟. Both allow animate as well as 
inanimate participants in the indirect argument-slot. 
 
(D8d)  Et        il y a       un   détail   d‟  importance   qui  semble  
          And     there is   a     point    of  importance   that   seems to 
  „And there is a major point that seems to 
 
avoir  échappé  au  capitaine Imrie 
have   escaped           to the Captain   Imrie 
have escaped Captain Imrie‟ 
 
(D17d) Ils      ont      essayé  de  résister  aux  voleurs   
           They PAST  tried     to  resist       to the  robbers 
  „They tried to resist the robbers‟ 
 
In examples (D8d) and (D17d), the indirect objects refer to people. Therefore animacy 
may again be motivating the choice of preposition à before the second argument. But 
strangely both predicates (D8) échapper „to escape‟ and (D17) résister „to resist‟ have 
negative connotations. There is tension between the first argument initiating the process, 
and the second argument at the receiving end. The former seems to be under attack; it 
must adopt a defensive strategy: resisting or running away. This amounts to creating 
either physical or mental space between itself and the other participant. It is the notion of 
distance that dominates those processes. 
 
(D8b)  Je  doute   que   de telles    tactiques  échappent  à  leur  attention 
  I   doubt   that  such          tactics        escape            to their    notice 
  „I doubt that such tactics escape their notice‟ 
 
 
(D17b) Notre  syndicat  a           résisté     à    l‟     introduction  de  l‟     automatisation 
  Our     union      PAST   resisted   to  the  introduction  of  the  automation 
  „Our union resisted the introduction of automation‟ 
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In (D8b) and (D17b), even inanimate participants like attention span and progress, are 
construed as aggressors from which the first arguments tactics and union must protect 
themselves. This implies that the internal argument must be equipped with a certain 
amount of volition and agentiveness, as if it were animate. Effectively, both arguments  
à leur attention „(to) their notice‟, and à l’introduction de l’automatisation „(to) the introduction 
of automation‟ are the results of human action. So the value of distance can also benefit 
from an extension of animacy. 
 
Another instance of extended meaning in our selection can be seen in the phrase  
(D20) tenir à „to hold dear‟. This use is clearly derived from the basic sense of the verb 
tenir „to hold‟. Whereas tenir involves physical contact between the subject and the object, 
(D20) tenir à refers to an emotional process. 
 
(D20b) Lorsqu‟ ils  atteignent  cet    âge,  ils     tiennent   à    leur    indépendance 
           When    they    reach         that   age,  they  value       to   their   independence 
  „When they reach that age, they value their independence‟ 
 
The derivation is easy to trace: what one likes, one wishes to hold. In this instance then, à 
underlines the distance between first and second argument: physical contact is 
impossible, but the emotional bond remains.   
 
Distance could be the core value of à in all our examples so far: for all verbs of 
communication, there is a distance between the sender and the recipient of the message, 
especially where technical support is used; and where tension prevails between the 
subject and object of the verb, a distance, maybe psychological, separates both 
participants; this may even involve the desire to create distance physically between them, 
as with the verb (D8) échapper „to escape‟. This dynamic process must somehow be 
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controlled, and it is only logical that it should be under the control of an agentive, and 
volitional, participant. It is even easier if that participant is also animate. In most cases, 
the participant that determines distance between the external and internal arguments, is 
the internal argument itself, hence its marking by the preposition à. But occasionally, we 
have seen that the principle of saliency may reverse this trend as with (D12) obéir/désobéir 
„to obey/to disobey‟: those twin predicates retain the preposition à, even though the 
volitional participant is expressed as the first argument; à still acts as a marker of distance 
(and possible tension) between the participants however. 
 
Can distance explain the use of à with verbs as diverse as (D16) ressembler „to resemble‟ 
and (D18) convenir „to suit‟ ?  
 
(D16d) Votre  père  et  vous   lui1       ressemblez  tous les deux  
            Your  father  and  you   to him   resemble        both 
           „Both you and your father resemble him  
 
 beaucoup  physiquement. 
   a lot           physically 
     very much physically‟ 
 
(D16b) La  situation  ressemble       à    celle   de  l‟     Europe        en  1940  
          The  situation    resembles       to   that   of   the   Europe     in   1940 
  „The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940‟ 
 
Whether the indirect object is animate as in (D16d) or inanimate as in (D16b), the value 
of distance can be invoked to explain in both cases the use of the preposition à. It is 
necessary for the participants lui „(to) him‟ and celle de „that of‟ to mark a distinction 
between them and the subject participants, or total identification might take place. The 
predicate (D16) ressembler „to resemble‟ automatically marks its second argument with à to 
emphasise that distinction. 
                                                 
1 Lui is an object pronoun that contains reference both to the object him and to its indirect status. 
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(D18b)Vous  devriez  faire  comme  le  docteur  pense  
  You    should    do      as          the   doctor    thinks 
  „You should do what the doctor thinks 
 
qu‟   il  conviendra  le    mieux  à   vous   et  à   votre bébé 
  that   it  will suit           the  best      to  you    and  to  your  baby 
  will suit you and your baby best‟ 
 
Finally, we can also relate the use of à with the verb (D18) convenir „to suit‟ to its core 
value of distance. Convenir comes from the latin „con venire‟, „come together‟. It originally 
referred to a process of moving with a purpose to reduce the distance between the 
participants involved. That alone explains adequately its presence with the modern form 
convenir; although the meaning of the predicate has evolved, its a-structure has retained 
the preposition à. 
 
We have been able to justify all uses of the preposition à in our selection of verbs 
through a single core value. Can we do the same now for preposition de ? 
 
5.1.2. Examples of verbs using the preposition de to introduce an indirect object 
 
- Locative de 
In our selection, only two verbs use prepositions with a locative sense. (D14) appuyer 
„to press‟ can use the prepositions à, sur and contre, and (D11) partir „to leave‟ requires the 
preposition de. 
 
 
 
(D14b) Le  jeune  homme  appuya  sur  un  bouton 
  The  young  man      pressed          on a     button 
  „The young man pressed a button‟ 
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(D11b) Mon  train  part  de  Euston  à  11 h 30 
           My   train   leaves   from Euston    at  11.30 
           „My train leaves Euston at 11.30‟ 
 
De is originally a locative preposition. It marks a reference point, and the predicate it 
appears with, describes movement away from that point. 
 
- The ‘separation’ value 
But de mainly appears in our selection with non-motion verbs such as (D5) divorcer  
„to divorce‟. 
 
(D5b)  Si   elle   veut       divorcer  de     lui,    elle  a     toute  ma  sympathie 
         If    she  wants to  divorce   from  him, she  has  all      my  sympathy 
    „If  she wants to divorce him, she has my  sympathy‟ 
 
The participant introduced by de is necessarily animate with this predicate. Why was de 
selected in this instance ? Which specific semantic value does it offer ? As with  
(D11) partir „to leave‟, it must involve movement away from the participant introduced by 
de: to divorce someone implies to move away from that person; it also means severing 
ties.  
Let us look at other verbs that also use the preposition de. 
 
(D4b)  Le  but   de  Charlton   a     décidé   du  match 
         The  goal  of  Charlton   PAST  decided   of the  match 
         „Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟ 
 
(D3d)  Il   a          changé  d‟ emploi 
           He  PAST  changed      of job 
  „He changed job‟ 
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Neither (D4) décider „to decide‟ nor (D3) changer „to change‟ are verbs of movement. 
However, both imply a change in situation for the participants of the process, a 
separation of past and present. We can illustrate that sense more clearly by taking a closer 
look at (D3) changer „to change‟: 
 
(D3b)  J‟ ai         changé  l‟ ampoule 
    I  PAST  changed  the  bulb 
  „I changed the bulb‟ 
 
It is possible to use the verb (D3) changer „to change‟ with a direct object, as well as an 
indirect one. The difference in meaning is not immediately obvious; both constructions 
mean „to change‟. But where a DO construction applies to the manipulation of the 
participant construed as the object, the IO construction applies to more serious events 
such as changing job, house, opinion … and even clothes (changer d’appartement „to change 
flat‟, changer d’avis „to change opinion‟, changer de chemise „to change shirt‟). Those events 
have wider implications for the subject of the process, such as physical movement; they 
often refer to non-reversible situations, with a „before‟ and an „after‟ being clearly 
delineated. 
With all three verbs (D5) divorcer „to divorce‟, (D3) changer „to change‟ and (D4) décider „to 
decide‟, we are faced with a sense of breaking away from the past to start things anew. 
Divorcing, changing things and making decisions all involve a value of „separation‟.  
         
- Non-volitional participant 
In all three instances, it is also the case that the participant which appears as the internal 
argument and is introduced by de, is not involved in the process at all. With a verb such 
as (D5) divorcer „to divorce‟, it is the participant represented as the subject who initiates 
the process; the second participant, even though animate, seems to have no bearing on 
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what is taking place. Incidentally, in French, where a divorce is consensual, both 
participants take the subject slot conjointly as in Pat et Marie divorcent „Pat and Marie are 
getting a divorce‟. 
In (D4b) Le but de Charlton a décidé du match „Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟, the match 
may be the participant primarily affected by the decision process, but it is inanimate and 
absolutely uninvolved in the event as it is also non-agentive.  
And the job in (D3d) Il a changé d’emploi „He changed job‟ is equally non-agentive, so that 
we are now a far cry from the participants encountered with the preposition à. Basically, 
we had found the latter to be volitional. There is no such value in the participants 
introduced by de. Rather it is non-volitionality that appears to be a requirement here. 
    
(D6d)  Pourquoi  devrais-  je  douter   de  lui ? 
  Why      should    I    doubt     of     him ? 
  „Why should I doubt him ?‟ 
 
(D6b)  Certains  de  nos  membres   doutent  de   l‟  efficacité   des       manifestations        
         Some      of   our  members   doubt     of   the  value         of the  demonstrations 
  „Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations‟ 
 
(D7b)  Ils  jouissent  d‟ un  niveau   de  vie     exceptionnel 
          They  enjoy       of  a    standard  of  living  exceptional 
         „They enjoy exceptional standards of living‟      
 
The verbs (D6) douter „to doubt‟ and (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ also require indirect objects with 
the preposition de. They are not verbs of movement, and it is difficult to construe them 
as involving the value „separation‟. Whereas (D6) douter „to doubt‟ uses both animate and 
non-animate objects, (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ only wants an inanimate participant as its 
internal argument. Inanimate objects are generally deprived of volitionality. But what of 
an animate object such as lui „(to) him‟ in (D6d)Pourquoi devrais-je douter de lui ? ‘Why 
should I   doubt him ?‟ It is not the first time we have encountered a human participant 
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with the preposition de. In (D5b) Si elle veut divorcer de lui, elle a toute ma sympathie „If she 
wants to divorce him, she has my sympathy‟, we had already remarked on the absence of 
involvement on the part of the participant expressed as the indirect object. It seems that 
we are faced with a similar situation in (D6d), with the second argument lui „(to) him‟ 
taking no part in the process. In fact, the predicate (D6) douter „to doubt‟ demands that its 
human subject express a judgement on its object. Being a psychological process, rather 
than a physical one, it relies entirely on its first participant. The object, be it even a 
human one, has little choice but to remain passive. 
 
- Passive value 
We cannot but note at this point how the preposition de coincidentally appears in passive 
constructions in French. Whereas the prototypical preposition in French passive 
sentences is par „by‟, used to introduce the agent of the process as the internal argument 
of the verb, there also exists the possibility of substituting de with certain types of 
predicates. 
 
(5.1)  Le     camion  était  conduit  par  une femme 
       The   lorry      was     driven     by     a     woman 
       „A woman was driving the lorry‟ 
 
(5.2)  Il  est  aimé  de  tous  ses  amis 
        He  is   loved   of  all      his   friends 
        „All his friends love him‟ 
 
In the first example the verb conduire „to drive‟ is an active process, involving movement 
and an agent marked here by the preposition par „by‟. But in the second example, the 
verb aimer „to love‟ describes an emotional process, without any active or agentive value. 
Therefore de can be selected to introduce the second participant, which is in no case an 
 73 
agent. On the contrary, neither agency nor volition is needed with a psych-verb such as 
aimer.  
 
As we have now established a consistent set of semantic values for both prepositions de 
and à, we can summarise our findings and investigate their cognitive basis. 
 
5.2. Links to cognitive theories 
 
Some cognitive linguists assume that the different semantic values of a preposition are all 
derived from a primitive locative sense. Can we convincingly establish such a pattern for 
both à and de ?  
 
5.2.1. ‘A’: from dot to distance  
According to Vandeloise (1991), there are two core values to the preposition à. The first 
one, as we saw earlier in chapter 3, is locative: à appears before a landmark, construed as 
distant, therefore unidimensional. A visual representation of this sense would be a simple 
dot, standing for an object without any defined shape or contours because of its distance 
from the viewer. As well as pointing towards this landmark, à carries a strong sense of a 
path leading towards it, according to Vandeloise. 
The second value is what Vandeloise terms „routine à‟: a conventionalised use of that 
preposition, wherever a preposition is needed. This prototypical value would be devoid 
of meaning.  
 
Both values actually confirm our line of reasoning here. Starting as a locative preposition, 
as all prepositions do in cognitive theories, à originally pointed to a distant location, 
without any particular physical features. The recipient in a process of communication, 
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often amounted to a location towards which the message was sent. So all recipients 
became à-marked internal arguments in the a-structures of verbs of communication.  
Those recipients were generally animate, and logically capable of volition and animacy 
(they could use those qualities to reply to the message they had received for instance), so 
that any participant accompanied by the preposition à automatically became endowed 
with those potential values. And the channel of communication could be identified with 
the „path‟ value of à. Once a path was established between the sender and the recipient, 
there was always the potential for that path to be used to reduce (or increase) the 
distance between the two participants of the communication process. That is how the 
„distance‟ value also became entwined with any further use of à. In fact, „distance‟ 
provided the motivation for all further uses of à, and we have seen that it underlines such 
diverse uses as (D17) résister à „to resist‟ and (D16) ressembler à „to resemble‟. 
 
It may also be that the prototypical use of à developed because this was a rather neutral 
preposition, immune to the traditional locative values of shape, size, dimension, etc. 
Therefore it would mark just about any type of participant. It might not be so much the 
intrinsic values of à that determine its frequent use to introduce indirect objects, as the 
very principle that determines the use of prepositional markers.  
Here we must refer back to what we have learnt about transitivity in general.         
If a predicate expresses a process of „carry-over‟ or „transfer‟ between two participants 
and if transitivity assesses the quality of that process, a direct object used as second 
argument would reflect a successful process, whereas an indirect object would signal an 
unsatisfactory transfer. In the case of à introducing the indirect object, we can speculate 
that its presence emphasises just that: a faulty process. It is not so much the value of the 
preposition, as its mere presence that is revealing.  
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But we could also equally assume that the values of „distance‟ and „path‟ inherent to à, are 
after all relevant to the nature of the fault involved. In that case, the „carry-over‟ would 
be affected by certain characteristics of the internal argument; those characteristics, as 
signalled by the presence of à, could include volition, animacy and agentiveness, or in 
more general terms, a willingness on the part of the object to put a distance between 
itself and the subject controlling the predicate. 
This second hypothesis entails that the nature of the preposition selected by the object 
reveals much about the process taking place. Let us try and verify this hypothesis with an 
analysis of the preposition de. 
 
5.2.2. ‘De’: from landmark to non-volitionality 
We have unequivocally established from the beginning that de is originally a locative 
preposition that refers to a landmark. Any process involving the use of de in a locative 
sense, involves movement away from that landmark. That primitive sense could be seen 
in the verbal construct (D11) partir de „to leave‟. 
We then established that an extended meaning of this locative sense, would involve a 
notion of separation between the subject and the object of a predicate. This happened 
with verbal phrases such as (D15) divorcer de „to divorce‟, (D3) changer de „to change‟ and 
(D4) décider de „to decide‟. The separation could be physical as well as psychological; it 
could apply to animate and inanimate objects; and in every case, the process was firmly 
directed by the subject, with the object appearing to dispel any active involvement. 
Finally, we saw with verbs such as (D6) douter „to doubt‟ and (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ that the 
notion of an uninvolved object, devoid of any agency or volitionality, could also be 
expressed by the preposition de. This sense is again a direct extension of the previous 
one, so that we have now established a sliding scale of semantic values for the 
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preposition de, starting from its primitive locative meaning and gradually moving away 
towards more abstract uses. 
 
This evolution from concrete locative sense towards a more abstract meaning is typical 
of the way prepositions in general are conceptualised in the area of cognitive linguistics. 
The relationships between the different values of a given preposition are either explained 
as a continuous derivation from one meaning to the next, as seems to be the case with de, 
or as a more complex network of interrelated meanings, sometimes radiating from a 
common core; this is rather the case with à. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
6.1. In favour of a more lexical approach 
 
Syntax, semantics and the lexicon are all part of the determination of argument structure, 
therefore they are all part of the determination of transitivity as well. We saw in chapter 2 
that some linguists were seeking to explain the whole area of argument structure by 
linking exclusively the two domains of semantics and syntax. Although this approach is 
supported in cognitive terms by researchers such as Langacker, neither Van Valin and 
LaPolla, nor Hopper and Thompson, nor Givón managed to construct a linking theory 
large enough to encompass all cases of argument structure. It quickly became apparent 
through more recent research presented in chapter 3, that the lexicon also had an 
important part to play in the process. Linguists such as Pinker, Levin, Wechsler and 
Gawron all acknowledged its role in various proportions. In this, they were at one with 
cognitivists like Lakoff, Lindner and Vandeloise who saw the semantic properties of 
individual words as the source of their use in discourse. Data analyses in chapters 4 and 5 
allowed us to examine verbs that presented interlingual differences of transitivity 
between English and French. Firstly, we asked whether one could distinguish a direct 
from an indirect object in the absence of any obvious lexical marker such as a 
preposition. An overlook of the issue of pronominal verbs in French showed us that 
rules in the style of the syntax-semantics interface, such as those purported by traditional 
grammar, were not completely satisfactory; here again, the issue of lexically-based 
semanticity, as advocated by Grimshaw, seemed a likely recourse to explain how the 
meaning of a verb could determine the transitivity status of its internal arguments. We 
then took a closer look at the prepositions selected by our data verbs, with the hope of 
establishing the guidelines that determine such choices, and furthermore, the very 
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reasoning that would justify the choice of direct vs. indirect transitivity for all predicates 
concerned. We succeeded in uncovering a consistent system that could form the basis of 
the selection process for prepositions such as à and de. Moreover, that system could be 
rooted in well-established cognitive views about prepositions. We also determined that 
the very motivation for the use of a preposition before a second argument was to 
underline a type of impediment to the process of carry-over expressed by a transitive 
structure.  
 
Throughout this research, the three domains of syntax, semantics and the lexicon have 
recurred over and over again. How exactly do they interact in the determination process 
of a predicate‟s transitivity status ? And what is the place of the lexicon in this triangle ?  
 In order to understand the principles at work when the argument structure of a 
predicate is being determined, we can ask about the most basic process of argument 
structure determination: that of a child‟s initial acquisition of a-structure. Pinker 
investigated that very process when he tried to explain Baker‟s paradox, or how we 
acquire the correct a-structures for verbs when we are seldom exposed to negative 
evidence. There are two possible answers to that question.  
The first answer considers all data individually, and establishes a lexicon in the child‟s 
mind. Every predicate is given its own entry, including details relating to its a-structure, 
as heard from evidence. Every time that predicate is heard again, new data is recorded 
into its lexical entry, such as the possibility of other a-structures. In this hypothesis, the 
determination of argument structure is an exercise in recalling a-structures from the 
predicate‟s lexical entry each time we wish to use it. Consequently every single argument 
would have its own linking rule, and the linking rules would work directly between the 
lexicon and syntax. 
 79 
The second hypothesis uses semantics as an intermediate between syntax and the lexicon. 
Each time a predicate is heard in the context of an utterance, its semantic components 
are analysed and the predicate is filed under a semantic heading, for instance verb of state 
or verb of communication. Each verbal semantic category triggers its own linking rules to 
certain syntactic patterns; for example, verbs of communication link to double object  
a-structures in English. In this account, the question of how semantics and syntax 
actually interface is completely relevant.  
However, as demonstrated by our analysis of pronominal verbs in chapter 4, no linking 
rules can establish alone how a status of direct or indirect transitivity can be conferred 
upon every argument. We always knew that the lexicon had a part in the determination 
of argument structure as a whole, so how does it affect the verbs in our selection 
specifically ?   
 
In Learnability and Cognition: the Acquisition of Argument Structure (1989), Pinker managed to 
reconcile both hypotheses in a way that may interest us particularly in this context. He 
assumes that a-structure acquisition takes place, as in the first hypothesis, through a 
purely lexical process of filing lexical entries for individual predicates (we saw in our 
second chapter that the a-structures were always part of a verb‟s entry in Pinker‟s theory). 
However we cannot deny that certain semantic categories relating to participants 
coincide astonishingly with established syntactic patterns. 1 
                                                 
1
1
 Pinker reminds us that people such as Perlmutter (1978) and Rosen (1984), to which 
we shall add Givón (1984; 1990), have observed how types of verbs across languages, are 
linked to identical syntactic structures: for instance „verbs of voluntary action, manner of 
speaking, and some involuntary bodily processes are unergative, and verbs of being in 
states, changing state, and changing existence are unaccusative (Perlmutter, 1978)‟ 
(p.225). More cross-linguistic evidence comes from Dryer (1986) who „reviews a diverse 
sample of languages with ditransitive constructions and notes that the second object is 
notionally a “patient/theme”, generally nonhuman, in the context of a first object that is 
a “goal/beneficiary”, generally human (pp.94-95).  
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Pinker thinks that such broad categories are really formed in the mind after initial 
acquisition. That is to say that once a predicate has found its place in the child‟s lexicon, 
it is then reassessed in order to find among its semantic components, some features 
which it might share with other predicates. As the child acquires more vocabulary, 
categories are formed that link together predicates with common semantic features. Thus 
the lexicon and the semantic categories start coexisting and sharing information.  
The next step must now link them to syntax. It is likely that children first rely exclusively 
on the lexical entries of verbs, giving weight to the first hypothesis. But as their 
vocabulary expands, they start using the semantic categories as a shortcut to determine a 
verb‟s argument structure. This implies that links are finally established directly between 
the semantic level and the syntactic level of argument structure: the notion of an 
interface is relevant after all. As adults, we probably rely heavily on those shortcuts, as 
they spare our memory patterns. So argument structure is determined individually for 
each predicate in the relationship that links the lexicon directly to syntax; this relationship 
is made of numerous linking rules between participants and argument-slots. An 
intermediate level of semantics, based on the generalisation of such rules into broad 
categories, can act as a shortcut to the determination of a-structure. 
 
In this view then, it must be assumed that, as with any attempt at generalisation, some 
elements do not fit the pattern. Whereas determination of argument structure may be 
done through the means of semantic classes, as has been observed frequently among 
languages of the world, some predicates remain impervious to classifications and can 
only be apprehended through the basic process of lexicon-to-syntax linking. It is likely 
that our data targeted such verbs that, through reasons of etymology mainly, did not 
follow the prototypical patterns. That is probably the very reason why they came to our 
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attention at all. Had they fitted into prototypical semantic classes, their a-structures 
would have been smoothly determined. But the very fact that two different processes 
seemed to be used in English and in French, highlighted discrepancies in the theory of a 
universal syntax-to-semantics interface.  
 
6.2. Questioning the universal / language-specific divide 
 
We should now reflect on the issue of universality in the determination process of 
argument structures. All theories of the syntax-semantics interface intrinsically assume 
that the semantic values used in that process are universal. All languages would have a 
sense of the human vs. the non-human, the animate vs. the inanimate, the agentive vs. 
the passive, etc. Those would form universal semantic categories, probably based on the 
universal human experience that is the cognitive perception of our environment. Such 
general classification form the basis of all areas of cognitive linguistics: energy 
transmission and movement as invoked by Langacker, or figures and grounds, paths and 
directions as used by Lakoff, Lindner and Vandeloise among many other linguists, are 
unquestionably universal in the minds of those who employ such concepts. Therefore, in 
the process of determination of transitivity, all human beings would analyse the world 
into identical semantic categories, according to a common cognitive basis, but every 
language would find its own way of expressing those values through specific syntactic 
patterns. In a nutshell, in the syntax-semantics interface, the semantics are universal but 
the syntax is language-specific. Here the cut-off point between universality and language-
specificity is the linking process itself. 
 
However our data analysis in this work somehow contradicts this simple assumption. We 
looked at verbs of similar meaning that adopted different syntactic patterns in two given 
 82 
languages. If we were to pursue the point of view of the syntax-semantics interface to its 
logical conclusion, we should have found systematic correspondences between English 
and French in accounting for the semantic values of the participants of each process. For 
example, where French expressed the value of non-volitionality of the second argument 
by the means of the preposition de, English would have systematically used its own 
syntactic device to signal non-volitionality. Instead the English language did not display 
any marker; nor did it use any specific markers for animacy, agentiveness, distance, etc. in 
our selection. There existed no systematic translation blueprints of those values between 
the two languages. The only possible explanation for this state of affairs is that English 
did not, at least for the verbs we selected, take any notice of those semantic values; 
therefore it did not need to mark them. This means that English did not apply the same 
semantic analysis to our verbs as French did. Effectively, both languages had their 
specific semantic approaches. This clearly implies that language-specificity may start 
earlier than the theories of the syntax-semantics interface would have us believe. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we need to have a look at English prepositions.  Let us 
select some English verbs that have a preposition as part of their argument structure. 
They are indirectly transitive. We shall also give their equivalent in French, which in 
every case is directly transitive. In effect, we will attempt the same exercise as in chapter 
5 but in reverse: we are now looking at verbs of indirect transitive behaviour in English, 
but direct transitive behaviour in French, in order to apprehend the semantic system that 
underpins English prepositions. 
 
(6.1a) to approve of/to disapprove of  (6.1b) approuver/ désapprouver 
(6.2a) to ask for    (6.2b) demander 
(6.3a) to hope for    (6.3b) espérer 
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(6.4a) to look at    (6.4b) regarder 
(6.5a) to look for    (6.5b) chercher 
(6.6a) to pay for    (6.6b) payer 
(6.7a) to smell of    (6.7b) sentir 
(6.8a) to wait for    (6.8b) attendre 
In every case, those predicates can be followed immediately by a noun phrase. 
 
Three different prepositions appear in this selection. We must find each one‟s core value. 
It is immediately apparent that at in (6.4a) to look at has a spatial value. It introduces the 
eye‟s target, which must be somewhat distant from the subject-onlooker. This value is 
reminiscent of French à, although the distance between the first and the second 
participant of the process need not be so great in English. The object observed can also 
have a variety of shapes and sizes; it is not restricted to a mere dot, as it was in French. 
The preposition for is the most used in this selection. In every case, it is consistent with a 
prospective value. To ask, to hope, to look, to pay and to wait are all imbued with a sense of 
expectation, a movement towards the future. We must remark that prospectiveness is 
notably absent from any of their French counterparts, except maybe for (6.3b) espérer „to 
hope‟. The latter is not marked in any way however, its prospective value being part of 
the meaning of the verb itself rather. Whereas the English verbs all focus on the gains to 
be had from the processes they describe, their equivalents in French focus matter-of-
factly on the processes themselves. Secondly, it must be pointed out that for seems to be 
a remarkably productive preposition in English, as it is used here with very common 
verbs, but its closest French equivalent, the goal preposition pour, is not used quite as 
much.  
Finally, we find two verbs which both use the preposition of. Traditionally it is said that of 
is the equivalent of the French de; if so, we should be able to find the same semantic 
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values at work with (6.1a) to approve of and (6.7a) to smell of as we did with (D11) partir de „to 
leave‟, (D5) divorcer de „to divorce‟, etc. The core values of the preposition de in French 
were separation, non-volitionality and passivity. It could be said that the second 
argument in a sentence including the predicates approve or disapprove, must be non-
agentive and non-volitional. As with the French (D6) douter de „to doubt‟, the process at 
stake involves a judgement on the part of the human subject; that process passivises the 
second argument, even when it is human. In (6.7a) to smell of  the use of the preposition 
of‟ is firstly motivated by the necessity of distinguishing two senses of the predicate smell: 
one sense is active, as in I smell a fire where the subject acts the process referred to by the 
predicate; the other sense is passive. In the sentence The garden smelt of honeysuckle the 
subject the garden is non-agentive. Therefore, it is no surprise to see precisely the 
preposition of‟ used with this passive sense.  
 
In conclusion, this exercise, random and incomplete as the sample may be, still yields a 
few lessons. It seems possible to find the same semantic values underpinning 
prepositions in both French and English; it certainly appears to be the case with de and 
of‟. It might even be the case to some extent with at and à. But already that example 
suggested that a common core feature might be interpreted in different ways by 
individual languages. Both prepositions might operate on related but not totally similar 
values. And sometimes prepositions which are supposedly equivalent, might actually be 
based on different values. For example, whereas for indicates prospectiveness, pour rather 
indicates a goal. In addition, respective frequencies for those prepositions are certainly 
not identical in both languages. 
 It is then rather difficult to assume, as the theories of the syntax-semantics interface did, 
that all languages break down the cognitive perception of their environment into 
identical categories. Here we have shown for instance that the semantic system 
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underlining English prepositions might function on a different interpretation of a given 
set of values from the French system. There is nothing stopping us from speculating that 
it might use a different set of values altogether. Therefore language-specificity in the 
determination of argument structure does not appear only at the level of semantics-to-
syntax linking. It is part and parcel of the semantic process itself. 
 
6.3. A redefinition of transitivity 
 
All the research about transitivity that we investigated in the course of this study, 
focussed on the distinction between intransitivity and transitivity. After Hopper and 
Thompson, we adopted the definition of transitivity as a „carry-over‟ or a „transfer‟ 
between two participants. We found that process justified in cognitive terms by the work 
of Langacker for example. In that perspective, one could distinguish the transitive 
predicates from the intransitive ones, by looking at the semantic value of their first 
participant (most often the subject in English or in French). In the case of a transitive 
process, the subject had a strong tendency to agentiveness; but with intransitive verbs, 
the subject tended to be a simple theme. However, no research considers the question of 
directness in transitivity: how is direct transitivity to be told apart from indirect 
transitivity ? Unlike the distinction between intransitivity and transitivity, this one must 
focus on the second argument of the predicate, the argument that appears immediately 
after the verb. Whether that argument uses a preposition or not, is related to the issue of 
its affectedness in the process.  
 
According to Givón, IO is „not an affected patient‟ (1984, p.109). Givón implies that the 
difference between a direct object and an indirect one, is that DO is affected by the 
process expressed by the predicate, whereas IO is not. But what does he mean by 
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„affected‟ ? If „affected‟ means „involved‟ in the transitive process, Givón is clearly wrong 
since every participant that has been assigned a slot in a predicate‟s a-structure is part of 
the process and must be affected by it.  If „affected‟ somehow means „manipulated‟, then 
he may be right. We saw in chapter 5 that the semantic values of humanity, animacy, 
agentiveness and volitionality were all connected to the use of a preposition before the 
second argument. They indicate that the object opposes all attempts at reification or 
passivisation that could deprive it of meaningful participation in the process. Therefore, 
the second argument may always be „affected‟ or involved, but it is not necessarily 
inactive within it. Some types of participants, when construed as objects, have the 
potential to exert some influence on the process. That potential is expressed by the 
presence of a preposition that determines a status of indirect transitivity for the argument 
structure of the predicate. The nature of the preposition used gives us information about 
the type of influence which the object actually has. In French, the preposition à tends to 
signal an object‟s strong opposition to the process initiated by the subject, by the means 
of establishing a symbolic distance from the latter. But by using the preposition de, a 
speaker assesses the object as being devoid of agentiveness and under the control of the 
subject.   
 
According to Hopper and Thompson, the more agency and the more volition its 
participants display, the higher the chances of transitivity are for a process. But as with 
any other approach to transitivity, Hopper and Thompson do not investigate the effects 
of that claim for each individual participant. Again, it is crucial to emphasise the 
distinction between first and second argument of the predicate. While agency and 
volition of the first argument do point to its agentiveness, therefore to the likeliness of a 
transferring (or transitive) process as exemplified by Langacker‟s energy chains, agency 
and volition on the part of the second argument may run counter to the smooth 
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implementation of that very process. It can have exactly the opposite effect and actually 
detransitivise the predicate. 
What agency, volition, etc. of the object actually highlight, is the ease with which a 
transfer is carried out, or in other terms, the degree of transitivity of the process. The 
more obstacles the object puts in the way of the subject‟s actions, the less transitive the 
verb will be. We must conceive of transitivity not as mere manipulation of objects by 
subjects, but as a struggle between participants bent on carrying out a process, and 
participants more or less willing to be affected by it. Cooperation on the part of the 
object translates into simple and direct transitivity; lack of cooperation, on the other 
hand, is signalled by a prepositional object, and translates into indirect transitivity.  
Therefore we are now able to add to Hopper and Thompson‟s initial approach to the 
issue of transitivity. It is a continuum in which indirect transitivity finds its natural place 
between total intransitivity and direct transitivity. Indirect transitivity is indeed transitivity 
in as much as it involves a process of transfer between at least two participants; it then 
stands on the right of intransitivity. But indirect transitivity also signals a difficult 
process, somewhat hampered by the semantic values pertaining to the object; for that 
reason, it stands on the left of pure transitivity. 
 
Intransitivity  |  Transitivity     
    indirect  direct 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix: Data verbs and examples 
 
This appendix lists all the verbs we will use as a basis for our analysis. They are 
designated by the letter D and a number, as determined by the alphabetical order of the 
English predicates. Each verb sees its typical argument structures, as indicated in our 
reference dictionaries, listed in the infinitive form for French and English.  
Then examples for all the argument structures are displayed. The French examples are 
translations of the concordancer-based English sentences quoted in our reference 
English dictionary. 
 
 
(D1)  to answer/répondre à 
 to answer something/répondre à quelque chose 
 to answer someone/répondre à quelqu’un 
 
(D1a)  She answered an advertisement for a full-time mother help 
 
(D1b)  Elle a répondu à  une  petite annonce  
 She answered to an advertisement 
„She answered an advertisement  
 
pour  une  aide maternelle  à temps plein 
 for a mother help   full-time 
for a full-time mother help‟ 
 
(D1c) Answer your father ! 
  
(D1d) Réponds  à  ton  père ! 
 Answer to your father ! 
 „Answer your father !‟ 
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(D2) to ask/demander à 
 to ask someone/demander à quelqu’un 
 to ask something/demander quelque chose 
 to ask someone something-to ask something to someone/demander quelque chose à quelqu’un 
 
(D2a) „How many languages can you speak ?‟ he asked the young girl 
 
(D2b)  “Combien de  langues  parlez- vous ?”     
             How many     languages  speak   you(SG)    
  „ How many languages can you speak ?  
 
  demanda-t-il à  la  jeune   fille 
  asked         he   to  the  young   girl 
          he asked the young girl‟ 
 
(D2c) He asked my name 
 
(D2d) Il  demanda  mon  nom 
 He asked  my  name 
 „He asked my name‟ 
 
(D2e) He started asking Diana a lot of things 
  
(D2f) Il  commença  à    demander  beaucoup   de   choses   à      Diana 
 He started        to   ask  a lot       of  things    to    Diana 
 „He started asking Diana a lot of things‟ 
 
 
(D3) to change/changer de 
 to change something/changer quelque chose 
 to change something/changer de quelque chose 
 
(D3a) I changed the bulb 
 
(D3b) J‟ ai         changé  l‟ ampoule 
    I  PAST  changed  the  bulb 
  „I changed the bulb‟ 
(D3c) He changed job 
(D3d)  Il   a          changé  d‟ emploi 
           He  PAST  changed      of job 
  „He changed job‟ 
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(D4)  to decide/décider de 
  to decide something/décider de quelque chose 
(D4a) Charlton‟s goal decided the match 
 
(D4b) Le  but   de  Charlton   a     décidé   du  match 
         The  goal  of  Charlton   PAST  decided   of the  match 
         „Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟ 
 
 
 
 
 
(D5)  to divorce/divorcer de 
  to divorce someone/divorcer de quelqu’un 
 
(D5a) If  she wants to divorce him, she has my  sympathy 
 
(D5b)  Si   elle   veut        divorcer   de     lui,    elle  a      toute  ma   sympathie 
         If   she    wants to  divorce    from  him, she  has   all       my   sympathy 
   „If  she wants to divorce him, she has my  sympathy‟ 
  
(D6)  to doubt/douter de 
  to doubt something/douter de quelque chose 
  to doubt someone/douter de quelqu’un 
(D6a) Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations 
(D6b)  Certains  de  nos  membres   doutent  de   l‟  efficacité   des        manifestations        
         Some      of   our  members   doubt     of   the  value         of the   demonstrations 
  „Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations‟ 
(D6c) Why should I doubt him ? 
 
(D6d)  Pourquoi  devrais-  je  douter   de  lui ? 
  Why      should    I    doubt     of     him ? 
  „Why should I doubt him ?‟ 
 
 
(D7)  to enjoy/jouir de1 
  to enjoy something/jouir de quelqu’un 
 
(D7a) They enjoy exceptional standards of living      
 
(D7b)  Ils  jouissent  d‟ un  niveau   de  vie     exceptionnel 
          They  enjoy       of  a    standard  of  living  exceptional 
         „They enjoy exceptional standards of living‟ 
                                                 
1 To enjoy is rather difficult to translate as it takes on a number of equivalents in French according to 
context. Let us note however that jouir de is not as common a translation as aimer or apprécier, both direct 
transitive verbs in French. 
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(D8)  to escape/échapper à 
  to escape something/ échapper à quelque chose 
  to escape someone/échapper à quelqu’un 
 
(D8a) I doubt that such tactics escape their notice 
 
(D8b)  Je doute   que   de telles    tactiques  échappent  à  leur  attention 
  I   doubt   that   such         tactics        escape            to their    notice 
  „I doubt that such tactics escape their notice‟ 
 
(D8c) And there is a major point that seems to have escaped Captain Imrie 
 
(D8d) Et        il y a       un   détail   d‟  importance   qui  semble  
          And     there is   a     point    of  importance   that   seems to 
  „And there is a major point that seems to 
 
avoir  échappé  au  capitaine Imrie 
have   escaped           to the Captain   Imrie 
have escaped Captain Imrie‟ 
     
 
(D9)  to fax/faxer à 
to fax something/faxer quelque chose  
to fax someone/faxer à quelqu’un 
 to fax someone something/faxer quelque chose à quelqu’un 
to fax something to someone/faxer quelque chose à quelqu’un 
 
(D9a) She faxed the bad news 
 
(D9b) Elle  a  faxé  la  mauvaise  nouvelle 
  She  PAST  faxed  the  bad   news 
  „She faxed the bad news‟ 
 
(D9c) She faxed her brother 
 
(D9d) Elle  a  faxé  à  son  frère 
  She  PAST faxed  to  her  brother  
  „She faxed her brother‟ 
 
(D9e) She faxed her brother the bad news  
(D9f)  Elle   a  faxé  la  mauvaise  nouvelle  à  son  frère 
          She    PAST    faxed    the  bad         news        to her   brother 
  „She faxed the bad news to her brother‟ 
(D9g) She faxed the bad news to her brother 
(D9f)  Elle   a         faxé  la  mauvaise  nouvelle  à  son  frère 
          She    PAST    faxed    the  bad          news        to her   brother 
  „She faxed the bad news to her brother‟ 
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(D10) to forgive/pardonner à 
to forgive something/pardonner quelque chose  
to forgive someone/pardonner à quelqu’un 
 to forgive someone something/pardonner quelque chose à quelqu’un 
 
(D10a) They had forgiven his delayed arrival 
(D10b) Ils      avaient  pardonné  son  retard 
            They   had     forgiven         his delay 
  „They had forgiven his delayed arrival‟ 
 
(D10c) They had forgiven their host 
(D10d) Ils      avaient  pardonné  à  leur  hôte 
            They   had     forgiven         to  their   host 
  „They had forgiven their host‟ 
 
(D10e) They had forgiven their host his delayed arrival 
(D10f) Ils      avaient  pardonné  à  leur  hôte son retard 
            They   had     forgiven         to  their   host his  delay 
 „They had forgiven their host his delayed arrival‟ 
 
 
(D11) to leave/partir de1 
  to leave something/partir de quelque chose 
 
(D11a) My train leaves Euston at 11.30 
(D11b) Mon  train  part  de  Euston  à  11 h 30 
           My   train   leaves   from Euston    at  11.30 
           „My train leaves Euston at 11.30‟ 
 
(D12) to obey/obéir à – to disobey/désobéir à 
  to obey something/obéir à quelque chose 
   – to disobey something/désobéir à quelque chose 
  to obey someone/obéir à quelqu’un 
- to disobey someone/désobéir à quelqu’un 
 
(D12a) The troops were reluctant to obey orders 
 
(D12b) Les  troupes rechignaient   à  obéir  aux   ordres 
           The  troops   were reluctant  to  obey     to the    orders 
  „The troops were reluctant to obey orders‟  
 
                                                 
1 To leave actually translates in three different ways in French: I have obviously selected the translation that 
yields an indirect transitive verb. We must note that partir de is strictly used for situations where the object 
is a location, either real or symbolic. The other two translations are quitter and laisser, both direct transitive 
verbs. 
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(D12c) It never occurred to them that they could disobey their parents 
 
(D12d) Il    ne        leur        est  jamais  venu à l‟esprit 
  It   NEG  to them     PAST   never    occurred             
          „It never occurred to them  
 
  qu‟   ils    pouvaient   désobéir  à  leurs  parents 
  that  they    could   disobey       to their   parents    
  that they could disobey their parents‟ 
 
(D13) to phone/téléphoner à 
to phone someone/téléphoner à quelqu’un 
  
(D13a) I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny 
 
(D13b) Je suis  retourné  à    l‟   hôtel   pour   téléphoner   à  Jenny 
          I    PAST  went back  to   the   hotel   to       phone         to  Jenny 
          „I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny‟ 
 
 
(D14) to press/appuyer sur 
  to press something/appuyer sur quelque chose 
 
(D14a) The young man pressed a button 
(D14b) Le  jeune  homme  appuya  sur  un  bouton 
  The  young  man      pressed on a     button 
  „The young man pressed a button‟ 
 
 
(D15) to renounce/renoncer à 
  to renounce something/renoncer à quelque chose 
 
(D15a) We have renounced the use of force to settle our dispute 
 
(D15b) Nous  avons  renoncé  à  l‟ usage  de  la  force 
           We      have     renounced  to  the  use     of      the force    
  „We have renounced the use of force  
 
  pour  régler  notre  différend  
  to       settle    our      dispute  
  to settle our dispute‟ 
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(D16) to resemble/ressembler à 
to resemble something/ressembler à quelque chose  
to resemble someone/ressembler à quelqu’un 
  
(D16a) The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940 
 
(D16b) La  situation  ressemble       à    celle   de  l‟     Europe        en  1940  
          The  situation    resembles       to   that   of   the   Europe     in   1940 
  „The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940‟ 
  
(D16c) Both you and your father resemble him very much physically 
 
(D16d) Votre  père  et  vous   lui       ressemblez  tous les deux  
            Your  father  and  you   to him   resemble        both 
           „Both you and your father resemble him  
 
 beaucoup  physiquement. 
   a lot           physically 
     very much physically‟ 
 
 
(D17) to resist/résister à 
to resist something/résister à quelque chose  
  to resist someone/résister à quelqu’un 
 
(D17a) Our union resisted the introduction of automation 
 
(D17b) Notre  syndicat  a           résisté     à   l‟     introduction  de   l‟    automatisation 
  Our     union      PAST   resisted   to the   introduction  of   the  automation 
  „Our union resisted the introduction of automation‟ 
 
(D17c) They tried to resist the robbers 
 
(D17d) Ils      ont      essayé  de  résister  aux  voleurs   
           They PAST  tried     to  resist       to the  robbers 
  „They tried to resist the robbers‟ 
 
(D18) to suit/convenir à 
 to suit someone/convenir à quelqu’un 
 
(D18a) You should do what the doctor thinks will suit you and your baby best 
(D18b)Vous  devriez  faire  comme  le  docteur  pense  
  You    should    do      as          the   doctor    thinks 
  „You should do what the doctor thinks 
 
  qu‟   il  conviendra    le    mieux  à   vous   et  à   votre bébé 
  that   it  will suit            the  best      to  you    and  to  your  baby 
  will suit you and your baby best‟ 
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(D19) to telegraph/télégraphier à 
to telegraph something/télégraphier quelque chose  
to telegraph someone/télégraphier à quelqu’un 
 to telegraph someone something/télégraphier quelque chose à quelqu’un 
  to telegraph something to someone/télégraphier quelque chose à quelqu’un 
 
(D19a) He had forgotten to telegraph condolences 
 
(D19b) Il  avait  oublié      de  télégraphier  ses condoléances 
          He  had  forgotten  to  telegraph          his  condolences 
  „He had forgotten to telegraph condolences‟ 
(D19c) He had forgotten to telegraph the widow 
 
(D19d) Il  avait  oublié   de  télégraphier  à  la  veuve 
          He  had  forgotten  to  telegraph          to  the  widow 
  „He had forgotten to telegraph the widow‟ 
(D19e) He had forgotten to telegraph the widow condolences 
 
(D19f) Il  avait  oublié   de  télégraphier ses condoléances   
          He  had  forgotten  to  telegraph          his condolences  
  „He had forgotten to telegraph the widow  
  à  la  veuve  
  to  the  widow  
  condolences‟ 
 
(D19g) He had forgotten to telegraph condolences to the widow  
 
(D19h) Il  avait  oublié   de  télégraphier ses condoléances   
          He  had  forgotten  to  telegraph          his  condolences 
  „He had forgotten to telegraph the widow  
  à  la  veuve  
  to  the  widow  
  condolences‟ 
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(D20) to value/tenir à1 2 
  to value something/tenir à quelque chose 
 
(D20a) When they reach that age, they value their independence 
 
(D20b) Lorsqu‟ ils  atteignent   cet    âge,  ils       tiennent   à    leur    indépendance 
           When    they    reach          that   age, they   value        to  their   independence 
  „When they reach that age, they value their independence‟ 
 
                                                 
1 To value something (translated as évaluer quelque chose) is a verb of measure, with no psychological effect 
attached: it behaves transitive directly in both languages: 
 
(D20c) The dealer valued the book at $200 
 
(D20d) L’  antiquaire  évalua   le   livre   à   200 dollars 
 The dealer valued the book at $200 
‘The dealer valued the book at $200’ 
 
2 Note that French allows the phrase tenir à quelqu’un whereas English does not have an equivalent *to value 
someone. 
 
 97 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Dryer, M.S., 1986: „Primary objects, secondary objects, and antidative‟- in Language 62, 
pp.808-845. 
 
Gawron, J.M., 1986: „Situations and prepositions‟- Linguistics and philosophy 9, pp.327-382. 
 
Givón, T., 1984: Syntax: a functional-typological introduction, Philadelphia: Benjamins, vol.1. 
 
Givón, T., 1990: Syntax: a functional-typological introduction, Philadelphia: Benjamins, vol.2. 
 
Grimshaw, J., 1982: „On the lexical representation of romance reflexive clitics‟- in Mental 
representation of grammatical relations (J.Bresnan, ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Grimshaw, J., 1990: Argument structure, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Hopper, P., and S.A. Thompson, 1980: „Transitivity in grammar and discourse‟- 
Language 56, pp.251-309. 
 
Jackendoff, R., 1990: Semantic structures, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Lakoff, G., 1987: Women, fire and other dangerous things, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp.416-461. 
 
Langacker, R., 1990: „Settings, participants, and grammatical relations‟- in Meanings and 
prototypes: studies in linguistic categorisation, London: Routledge. 
 
Langacker, R., 1991: Foundations of cognitive grammar, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
vol.2, ch.3. 
 
Levin, B., 1993: English verb classes and alternations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Perlmutter, D., 1978: „Impersonal passives and the unaccusative hypothesis‟- in Proceedings 
of the Berkeley linguistics society 4, pp.157-189. 
 
Pinker, S., 1989: Learnability and cognition: the acquisition of argument structure,  
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Rosen, C., 1984: „The interface between semantic roles and initial grammatical relations‟- 
in Studies in relational grammar (D.Perlmutter and C.Rosen, eds), Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Ruwet, N., 1972: Théorie syntaxique et syntaxe du français, Paris: Seuil, pp.87-125. 
 
Talmy, L., 1988 : „Force dynamics in language and cognition‟- in Cognitive science 12,  
pp.40-100. 
 
Ungerer, F. and H.-J. Schmid, 1996: An introduction to cognitive linguistics, Harlow: Longman. 
 
 98 
Vandeloise, C., 1991: Spatial prepositions: a case study from French, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, pp.157-185. 
 
Van Valin, R.D. and R.J. LaPolla, 1997: Syntax: structure, meaning and function, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, ch.3-4. 
 
Vendler, Z., 1967: Linguistics in philosophy, Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press.  
 
Wechsler, S., 1995: The semantic basis of argument structure, Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Collins COBUILD, 1987: English Language Dictionary, London: Collins. 
Le nouveau Petit Robert, 1995: Dictionnaire de la Langue française, Paris: Dictionnaires le 
Robert. 
 
 
